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INTRODUCTION
W it comes to speech, child pornography' is perhaps more
reved in the United States than any other form of expres-
T Tsion. Its distribution andpossession falloutside the scope of
First Amendment? protection.3 Even "virtual" child pornography-images
The United States Supreme Court has never established, as one federal
appellate court recently put it, "a single one-size-fits-all constitutional definition
of child pornography." United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 69 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 115 (1999). In contrast, the Court has defined a specific, three-
part test for another category of sexually explicit speech: obscenity. Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth the three-part constitutional
standard for determining obscenity). Child pornography is defined for purposes of
federal law at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (Supp. IV 1998).
2 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have
been incorporated through the Fourteenth AmendmentDue Process Clause to apply
to state and local government entities and officials. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
3New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that the distribution
of materials defined as child pornography under New York law is "without the
protection of the First Amendment"); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 103 (1990)
(holding that "Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of
child pornography").
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that merely appear to be of minors engaged in sexual conduct-is banned
under federal law.4
And when it comes to professions and occupations, none is perhaps
more loathed and distrusted than that ofjournalists.5 After sensational and
excessive coverage of the scandal between President Bill Clinton and
erstwhile intern Momca Lewmsky in 1998,6 public anger at news organiza-
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1998) (defining child pornography to
include, among othervisual depictions, computer-generated images ofmmors who
appear to be engaging in sexually explicit conduct). The legislative record behind
the law on virtual child pornography reveals that Congress was concerned that new
technologies allow for the creation ofvisual inages "ofwhat appear to be children
engaging m sexually explicit conduct that are virtually indistinguishable to the
unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of actual children
engaging in sexually explicit conduct." S. REP.No. 104-358, at 2 (1996). How are
these images created? Professor Debra Burke writes:
No longer are children needed m the production of child pornography.
Through a technique know as morphing, the image of a Penthouse Pet can
be scanned into a computer, then transformed fairly inexpensively through
animation techniques into the image of a child. This computer-generated
pornography, or virtual child pornography, can be customized to suit
specific sexual preferences and used to alter non-obscene pictures of
existing children. It can also be created imaginatively from adult
pornography.
Debra D. Burke, The Crminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A
Constitutional Question, 34 HARV J. ON LEGIS. 439, 440-41 (1997) (footnotes
omitted).
5 Bruce Sanford, a media defense attorney and partner with the law firm Baker
& Hostetler, wrote in 1999 that "[a] canyon of disbelief and distrust has developed
between the public and the news media. Deep, complex and so contradictory as to
be airless at times, this gorge has widened at an accelerating rate during the last
decade. Its darkness frightens the media." BRUCE W. SANFORD, DON'T SHOOT THE
MESSENGER: How OUR GROWING HATRED OF THE MEDIA THREATENS FREE
SPEECH FOR ALL OF US 11 (1999). Even journalists today often "find fault with
how they do theirjobs." Dylan Loeb McClain, More Journalists Are Critical ofthe
Media, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1999, at C9.
6 Lewmsky was alleged to have had "sexual liaisons with President Clinton."
William Booth & William Claibome, Lewmnsky Seeks A 'Normal' Life, WASH.
POST, Feb. 4, 1998, at A12. President Clinton acknowledged in a televised speech
on August 17, 1998, that he had "a relationship with Miss Lewmsky that was not
appropriate." Peter Baker & John F Hams, Clinton Admits to Lewmnsky
Relationship, Challenges Starr to End Personal 'Prying, WASH. POST, Aug. 18,
1998, at Al. For background on the upbringing and life of Monica Samille
Lewmsky, see Romesh Ratnesar, The Days ofHerLife, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 36.
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tions was "boiling over."7 Recent surveys confirm what common sense
suggests-that many people today seejournalists as often biased mdividu-
als who invade others' privacy and over-sensationalize stones to sell
newspapers.'
Now put the two together, and it seems clear that a journalist caught
transmitting and receiving child pornography on the Internet is highly
unlikely to receive any public sympathy. "Lock up the pervert and throw
away the key," one can imagine onlookers shouting at the offending
reporter as he's hauled off to jail.
But it may not always be that simple or quite such an open-and-shut
case. A rush to judgment may not only be hasty, in fact, but thoroughly
shortsighted and seriously misguided. Consider the following questions,
each adding complicating facts to the above-mentioned scenario:
• What happens if the journalist was viewing the offending images as
part of hIs research for a news story "investigating the frightening and
horrifying cyberworldwhich involvesthe sexual exploitation of children" 99
* What happens if the same journalist professes to be "dedicated to the
ideals of journalism as a source of information for the public regarding
matters of significance to society""0 and maintains that trading child
pornography "was an unfortunately necessary means of gathering
information""1 and securing access to a world from which he otherwise
would have been excluded?
* And does it make any difference that the same journalist earlier had
done a three-part story for a major Washington, D.C. radio station-
WTOP-reporting on the phenomenon of child pornography on America
Online, a major Internet service provider?12
According to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in its April 2000
ruling in United States v. Matthews,"3 these added facts don't make a
7Tom Hamburger, Impeach the Media?, STARTRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Feb.
15, 1999, at 13A.
I Susan Sward,NewspaperEditors Study Ways toRegamPublic Trust, Respect,
S.F CHRON., Apr. 12, 1999, atAl.




2 Id. at 8 (detailing when Lawrence C. Matthews first began investigating the
exploitation ofchildren on the Internet). In January 2000, America Online engaged
in a "stuming takeover" of traditional media giant Time Warner. Allan Sloan,
Hunting the Big Bucks, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24,2000, at 28.
3 United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
260 (2000).
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difference.1 4 The appellate court unanimously denied Lawrence C.
Matthews, an award-winning veteranjournalist, 5 the rightto present aFirst
Amendment-based free press defense to criminal charges that he sent and
received child pornography over the Internet. 16 The court concluded that
although Matthews's clain that he traded m childpornography for a proper
purpose-solely as a journalist engaged in the process of gathering
information for a news story---"has visceral appeal,"' 7 his "asserted First
Amendment defense sinply enjoys no support m the law. Accordingly, we
must reject it."' 8
The decision conflicts with those from other federal courts that have
allowed defendants to present what might be thought of as a First
Amendment-grounded "legitimate-use defense" to charges oftransporting
or possessing childpornography. In an unpublished order in 1992, a federal
district court inthe state ofWashmgton heldthat "[a]n academic researcher
who transports or possesses child pornography does not run afoul of the
legislative purposes behind banning transportation or possession of child
pornography."' 9 The trial court thus concluded that child pornography
legitimately possessed or transported for academic purposes is one of the
"narrow categories" of that material protected by the First Amendment.2 0
More importantly and recently, a federal district court in New York
held in a reported decision that a psychiatrist "may well advance the
argument that his possession of childpornographywas pursuant to research
he was undertaking in Ins capacity as a psychiatrist at the Auburn
Correctional Facility."21 The court suggested that this "as-applied '
defense could be presented to the jury to "evaluate the credibility of
defendant's proffered explanation."a 3
Given both this split of authority among federal courts located in
different circuits and the hot-button topic of child pornography, the issue
in Matthews was ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court. The
14 Id. at 344-50.
15 Matthews won a George Foster Peabody Award for his reporting. Id. at 339
16 Id. at 350.
17Id. at 344.
I1 Id. at 350.
19 United States v. Bryant, No. CR92-35R, at A7 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 1992)
(order denying motion to dismiss and setting an evidentiary hearing on motion to
suppress).20Id.





Supreme Court, however, demed Lawrence Matthews's petition for a writ
of certiorari in late 2000. Perhaps the most nportant reason the case
should have been heard is sunply tis: the only way the public will be able
to know the true extent of the twin problems of child pornography and
sexual exploitation of minors on the Web (as well as to determine how
effectively law enforcement agents are policing that unseemly online
world) is ifjoumalists like Lawrence Matthews and academic researchers
are able to conduct research freely on these topics and to report their
findings to the public in mass media outlets and scholarly journals.
This Article thus argues that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Matthews
was, m a word, wrong. Journalists-like professors and psyclatnsts
-should be allowed, at the trial court level, to make a First Amendment-
based argument in their defense that their receipt and transmission of child
pornography constitutes a legitimate or good use. The ability to assert such
a defense is highly controversial because, m essence, it amounts to a
request to possess a right to engage in criminal conduct in order to gather
news.
This Article further contends that Lawrence Matthews ultimately was
attempting to engage in speech affecting political decision making,
arguably the most prized form of expression under the First Amendment.24
In particular, it argues that First Amendment interests in gathering facts for
news stones that could affect or influence legislative initiatives and
actually change the laws on child pornography outweigh those that prevent
journalists from rmsmg a "legitimate-use" defense. A journalist should at
least be able to assert this defense-an opportunity that Matthews was
denied-and it should be left for the fact finder to determine whether, in
fact, the use was legitimate.
The Matthews case raises a number of important questions related to
the viability of a "legitimate-use" defense. The threshold issue is whether
there is any precedent that would support a defense or privilege for a
journalist to violate generally applicable laws, such as those against child
pornography, when conducting research for an article that could affect
public laws and policies. Even in the absence of any precedent, one still
must consider whether there are any valid policy considerations that
support the creation of such a defense or privilege.
Assuming that such an argument can be made, another nportant issue
arises: Who should be allowed to assert this defense? This question ensues
24 "There is little disagreement that political speech is at the core of that
protected by the FirstAmendment" ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONALLANV:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.2, at 752 (1997).
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because the Fourth Circuit framed the case as presenting "an issue of first
impression m this circuit: does the First Amendment permit a bona fide
reporter to trade m child pornography to 'create a work ofjournalism'9"z2
Defining who constitutes a "bona fide reporter" may be a difficult task,
because journalism is an unlicensed profession m the United States. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, however, m In re Madden,26 recently set
forth a three-part test27 for determining who is a journalist within the
context of a qualified reporter's privilege not to divulge the identity of
sources.2
Finally, another critical issue involves the instructions that a jury
should receive for determmmg whether, in fact, the defendant was engaged
in a legitimate use of child pornography for a valid journalistic purpose.
This Article proposes, for scholarly critique and judicial review, a set of
criteria that might be useful m guiding jurors through this process. 29 The
suggested guidelines articulated here are to be considered by juries in a
totality-of-the-circumstances approach, with no one factor controlling or
dominating the analysis.
Part I ofthis Article describes the twin problems of child pornography
and sexual predators in cyberspace. 0 Part II then sets forth the facts, issues
and arguments in UnitedStates v. Matthews, as well as the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning m denying Matthews the right to present a First Amendment-
based "legitimate-use" defense.31 Part III critiques and criticizes the
decision. 2 Part H also explores the consequences and ramifications of the
I United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 342 (4th Cir.) (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 260 (2000).26In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998).
271d. at 131 ("[I]ndividuals claimg the protections ofthejournalist's privilege
must demonstrate the concurrence of three elements: that they- 1) are engaged in
investigative reporting; 2) are gathering news; and 3) possess the intent at the
inception of the news-gathering process to disseminate this news to the public.").
' See generally Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist? Wrestling
With a Definition of "Journalist" in the Law, 103 DICK. L. REV 411 (1998)
(analyzing the decision m In re Madden).
" See mnfra pp. 60-63.
31See infra notes 36-63 and accompanying text. "Cyberspace, originally aterm
from William Gibson's science-fiction novel Neuromancer, is the name some
people use for the conceptual space where words, human relationships, data,
wealth, and power are manifested by people using CMC [computer-mediated
communication] technology." HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY:
HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 5 (1993).31 See infra notes 64-250 and accompanying text.
32See infra notes 251-300 and accompanying text.
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Matthews ruling for both journalism and the public, and it situates that
result within the broader context and fiamework of a growing public and
legal backlash agamst aggressivejournalistic news-gatherng practices. The
Article argues, m brief, that this public hostility toward the press produces
a climate in which mvestigativejournalists are not likely to receivejudicial
sympathy for their surreptitious and duplicitous news-gathering activities,
regardless of their actual merit or necessity 33 The Matthews decision is
more easily understood and better explained when placed in this broader
context.
Part IV then articulates a set ofpotentialjary instructions for determin-
ing when a journalistic use of child pornography might be legitimate,
should federal appellate courts other than the Fourth Circuit decide to adopt
such a defense. 34 Bridging law with ethics, the Conclusion ultimately posits
that, given both the extent and gravity ofthe dual problems of online child
pornography and sexual predators today, the Court should not only have
granted certiorari in Matthews but also should have allowed journalists and
other researchers the opportunity to present a "legitimate-use" defense in
cases in which they are accused of trafficking in child pornography 5 The
case represented an excellent chance for journalists to explain cogently to
the Court and the public the inportance of news gathering and the
watchdog role of the press in the new millennium. The case also presented
a chance to quiet criticism of the journalism profession.
I. THE SORDID SEXUAL UNDERGROUND OF CYBERSPACE:
PREDATORS, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE PROMISED LAND FOR PEDOPHILES
Anyone surfing the World Wide Web today certainly is aware that
"this new marketplace of ideas 37 is, in fact, a virtual and vibrant market-
33 See generally Clay Calvert, The Psychological Conditions for a Socially
Significant Free Press: Reconsiderng the Hutchins Commission Report Fifty Years
Later, 22 VT. L. REV 493, 517 (1998) (arguing that "[a] public that does not value
the press when it plays its roles as educator and watchdog is a public pruned to
penalize it").
34 See infra notes 301-11 and accompanying text
" See infra notes 312-30 and accompanying text36The World Wide Web "is a global hypertext system that runs on the Internef'
and allows one to "navigate by clicking on hyperlinks (embedded links) that
connect to other documents or graphic, audio or video resources." Joseph
Kershenbaum, E-Commerce Primer: A Concise Guide to the NewPublic Network,
E-COMMERCE L. REP., Sept. 1999, at 14, 14-15.37 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997). The concept of a marketplace of
ideas is not new. It "is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech
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place ofpornography?8 One particularly pernicious and related problem is
that of sexual predators who not only receive and transmit child pornogra-
phy on the Web, 9 but also lure and entice mnors, via chat room conversa-
tradition." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992). The
marketplace metaphor "consistently dominates the Supreme Court's discussions of
freedom of speech." C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY ANDFREEDOM OF SPEECH
7 (1989). The metaphor is used frequently today, more than eighty years after it
first became a part of First Amendment jurisprudence with Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s often-quoted admonition "that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See
generally W Wat Hopkms, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace ofIdeas,
73 JOURNALiSM & MASS COMM. Q. 40 (1996) (providing a recent review of the
Court's use of the marketplace metaphor).
38 According to Forrester Research, a company that tracks the Internet
pornography mdustry, the market for online adult fare now is worth approximately
$1 billion m sales annually. David Lazarus, Trcks ofthe Trade, S.F CHRON., Sept
11, 1999, at DI.
31 A review of police and court-related stones from newspapers across the
United States during just a three-month penod-March through May
2000-suggests that the receipt and transmission of child pornography on the
Internet is a serious problem. See, e.g., Nathan Collins, Teen Girl Caught in Porn
Sting, DETROIT NEWS, May 5, 2000, Metro, at 5 (describing the case of a
seventeen-year-old Michigan girl arrested and accused of distributing over the
'Internet sixteen "images of minors having sex with other kids, adults and
aninals"); Henry K. Lee, Pleasanton Coach Faces Child-Porn Charges, S.F
CHRON., Mar. 21, 2000, at A20 (describing the case of a California man charged
with two counts of child pornography related to downloading more than fifty lewd
images of children in a two-month period in 1999 and possessing child
pornography); Russell Lissau, Woman Arrested on Charges of Child Porn, CHI.
DAILY HERALD, May 9,2000, at 1 (describing the case of an Illinois woman who
was "accused of sending pornograpluc images of young children having sex with
adults to computer users in Califorma"); Lesley Rogers, Ex-UW-Offcial To Stand
Tral in Child Porn Case, WIS. ST. J., May 17,2000, at 3B (describing the case of
a former Umversity of Wisconsin-Madison assistant dean accused of using a
Umversity computer to download "thousands of files of pictures of adults having
sex with children"); Pawtucket Man Sentenced in Child-Pornography Case,
PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL., May 20, 2000, at 10A (descnbing the case of a Rhode
Island man who was sentenced to thirty-three months m federal prison for
possessing images on his computer of children engaging in sexually explicit
activity); RosaMana Santana, Strongsville Man Charged With Having Web Child
Porn, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Olo), May 19,2000, at 3B (describing the case
of an Ohio man who allegedly had more than 600 computer images involving child
2000-2001]
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tions, into illegal sexual conduct at arranged meeting places. ° By the year
2002, an estimated forty-five million children are expected to be online,
giving cyber-stalking pedophiles a huge pool of potential victims from
which to choose.41 As one federal prosecutor told a jury in a 1999 case
involving a man accused of raping a fourteen-year-old girl after using
Internet chat rooms to bait her to a motel, "[t]he Internet is a powerful tool
that can be used for good, but it's also a powerful tool for predators looking
to prey on young girls.' 42 Or, as a prosecutor in Orange County, Califorma
recently put it, the Internet "really is the promised land for child molest-
ers."43
The numbers bear out this carnal capacity. The FBI's Innocent Images
Task Force, a group that polices cyberspace for sexual predators, "opened
1500 criminal cases m 1999 focusing on children and the Internet."44 The
task force was founded in 1993 and made its first well-publicized arrests
in 1995 of individuals transmitting child pornography and soliciting sex
from rumors using America Online.45 According to a recent report on the
CBS news magazine 48 Hours, investigators believe there could be tens of
thousands of sexual predators searching the Internet for victims.
pornography on a computer seized from his home); Linda Satter, ManFaces Child
Porn Site Charge, AP.KDEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, May 11, 2000, atB5 (describmg the
case of an Arkansas man accused in federal court "of operating an Internet site
featuring child pornography").
o See, e.g., M. J. Zuckerman, NetEntices, then Traps Pedophiles, USA TODAY,
Apr. 19, 2000, at 7D (describing the case of a marred doctor with two young
children who was sentenced in May 2000 to thirty months in federal prison for"sex
crimes involving a child and initiated on the Internet," and on whose computer
were found 250 images of child pornography).41 JanetH. Cho, $300,000 U.S. Grant to Fight OnlinePredators, PLAINDEALER
(Cleveland, Oio), May 12, 2000, at 3B.
42 Michael James, Online Sex Trial Opens, BALT. SUN, Dec. 8, 1999, at lB. The
story of one young female victim of an Internet sexual predator is told m a book
calledKatie.com. ClaudiaFeldman, This is Katie., HOUSTONCHRON., May 7,2000,
Lifestyle, at 1 (describing the saga of Katie Tarbox and her ordeal as a fourteen-
year-old girl with a forty-one-year-old sexual predator).
43 Jack Leonard, Online Sex Banter Leads to Criminal Case, L.A. TIMES
(Orange Co. ed.), June 2, 2000, atB1.
"Maria Gold, Mom Hunts Pedophiles on Internet, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2000,
atAl.
' Kara Swisher, On-Line Child Pornography Charged as 12 Are Arrested,
WASH. POST, Sept 14, 1995, at Al.
' 48Hours: Cyberstalker (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 30,2000) (transcript
on file with authors).
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To catch these individuals, law enforcement officials often go online
and pose as youngsters.' FBI agents, for instance, probe chat rooms
"identified as popular meeting places for predators and their [young]
victims."'4 These undercover sting operations are so common today that
Shar Steele, an attorney for the Electromc Frontier Foundation,49 recently
remarked that "[tjhe vast majority of 12- to 14-year-old girls hanging out
in chat rooms with sexually explicit titles to them are most likely cops, and
if pedophiles don't realize that, they're pretty stupid."'0
Consider the job of FBI agent Bruce Applin. His undercover work
posing as a thirteen-year-old girl on the Internet was instrumental in the
March 2000 guilty plea of Patrick Naughton,"' a former Infoseek Corp.
executive, for attempting to solicit sex from a minor.' Applin works out of
I
7 Jim Walsh, Cybersex Crime Fight Intensifies, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 31,
2000, at B7481 Id. In one such recent case, a former Allentown, Pennsylvania preacher was
convicted for using a computer and an Internet chat room to send child
pornography to someone that he believed was an eleven-year-old girl. Elliot
Grossman, Ex-Preacherimprsoned OverPorn, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.),
Apr. 27, 2000, atB1. The recipient turned out to be an FBI task force member. Id.
A search of the ex-preacher's three home computers revealed more than 20,000
electronic images of child pornography. Id.
49 For information about the Electronic Frontier Foundation and its activities,
see the organization's Web site ElectronicFrontierFoundation, at http://www.eff.
org (last visited June 18, 2000).
so Suzanne Choney, Cops Prowl Web to Trap Pedophiles, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRI., Oct. 3,1999, atAl. Some pedophiles, mfact, may be catching onto the online
sting operations. The U.S. mail is becoming the "preferred route" once again for
transmitting and trading child pornography. Ted Sherman, Internet Child Porn-
ography SneaksPast Federal Stings into Mail, SEATILE TMES, Aug. 1,1999, atA14.
Use of the mail, however, is not necessarily any safer for pedophiles and porn-
ographers. Postal inspectors frequently run sting operations to lure those trafficking
m child pornography and make controlled deliveries to arrest customers. Id.
11 Naughton is a former executive vice president of Walt Disney Co.'s Go.com
Internet site and was employed by Infoseek Corp. at the time of his arrest Greg
Miller, Former Exec Pleads Guilty to Soliciting Sex with Minor on Net, LJL TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2000, at Cl. He was arrested on the Santa Monica Pier m Southern
California m September 1999, when he showed up for what he allegedly expected to
be a "sexual rendezvous with a teenage girl" whom he corresponded with m a chat
room. Id. Naughton, however, claimed it was all just a fantasy and that he believed he
was actually corresponding with an adult pretending to be a young girl. Id.
" Greg Miller, Careers: A Closer Look at 'Dream Jobs', L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2000, pt. C2 (Business), at 10.
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
an FBI office on Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles, where he and fellow
agents sign on to the Web under teenage identities, then enter chat rooms
and wait for pedophiles to approach.3 He generally spends about twenty
hours out of a typical sixty-hour week online.54
Local law enforcement agencies are also playing an active role in
policing tins new, technology-facilitated crime wave.55 For instance, an
Ohio man in May 2000 pleaded guilty m federal court to charges stemming
from online conversations with someone whom he thought was a thirteen-
year-old boy.56 When he flew to Texas to-meet the boy and have sex with
him, the suspect was arrested and, undoubtedly, quite surprised to find out
that he had been conversing with a Houston police officer."
These pedophile predators are referred to as "travelers" by law enforce-
ment personnel because they often travel from state to state to meet the
youths whom they contact online. Almost every day police officers or
federal agents arrest a traveler.59 Although the FBI is often successful in
prosecuting the travelers that it traps online, the average sentences are not
particularly stiff usually rangmg from just eighteen to twenty-four months.6°
5 Id.
I One of the top local efforts in the United States is that of Operation Blue
Ridge Thunder, run by the Bedford County Sheriff's Office m Virginia. See
Operation Blue Ridge Thunder, at http://www.blueridgethunder.com (last visited
May 27,2000).
56 6 1/2-Year Sentence Imposed on Man in Online Sex Case, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, May 27, 2000, at 4C.57 Id.
58 Parry Aftab, The Cybercops, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 31, 2000, at 24.
59 CBS Evening News: Sexual Predators on the Internet Being Staked Out
by Federal Agents and Other Law Enforcement (CBS television broadcast,
May 22, 2000) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter CBS Evening
News].
6 MJ. Zuckerman, Crackdown Stung by Short Sentences, USA TODAY, Apr.
19, 2000, at 2D. In one egregious case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that a trial court judge who had given a former Belgian consulate official six
months of house detention because he believed the crime was "victimless" had
abused his discretion in giving such a lenient sentence. Eric Siegel, Debeir to Get
Longer Sentence, BALT. SUN, July 31, 1999, at lB.
In May 2000, the U.S. Sentencing Commission called for Congress to consider
a new set of sentencing guidelines with substantially higher prison sentences for
sexual predators who stalk minors on the Web. Gary Fields, Congress to Address
Cybercrime Sentencing, USA TODAY, May 1, 2000, at 3A.
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Not only are the sentences short, but the incidence ofadult sexual predators
meeting mnors is increasing.6'
"We don't have another crime problem growing like this," FBI agent
Jack Boyle remarked in May 1999 62 In fact, one year later in May 2000,
the Innocent Images task force was taking about twenty-sLx new cases each
week.63
II. TRADING IMAGES, DOING TIME:
HOW LAWRENCE MATTHEWS WENT FROM JOURNALIST TO FELON
It was into this sordid world of chat rooms, child pornography and
sexual predators that Lawrence Matthews allegedly plunged headfirst in
1996, using screen names such as "MrMature" and"Dd4SubFem" to mask
his identity.Y According to the federal government's case against him,
Matthews's America Online usage records revealed that in 1996, from July
7 through December 11, he allegedly logged on using these or other screen
names nearly every day and, often, several times each day.65 Frequently,
Matthews would venture into the "Preteen" chat room, a place in which he
allegedly sent and received at least 160 photographs depicting child
pornography.'
But that was not all Matthews allegedly did in the chat room. He had
online conversations with the type of individuals described in Part
I67-- members of the Innocent Images task force posmg as mior females.68
In one case, Matthews told a federal agent posmg as a thirteen-year-old girl
that if she agreed to meet him, he would perform oral sex on her, make her
climax via manual stimulation and oral sex, and have intercourse with
her.69 He also said he would ask her to perform a strip tease for him.70
According to the government's brief filed with the Fourth Circuit Court of
6 1 See Mike Smder, Study: Kids LaclangNet Superviszon, USA TODAY, May 27,
1999, at IA.62Id.
63 CBS Evening News, supra note 59.
1 Brief of Appellee at 5-8, United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir.
2000) (No. 99-4183).
6sId. at6.
I Id. at 6-7.
67See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.





Appeals, Matthews had a similar sexually charged conversation with
another agent posing as a fourteen-year-old girl.71
With allegations of such prurient behavior pending against him, one
would anticipate a flat demal from the suspect. But that was far from the
response of Lawrence Matthews. "He readily admitted," to FBI agents and
in ]us bnefto the Fourth Circuit, that "he was on-line communicating with
persons in the chat rooms and trading pornography."72 More importantly,
Matthews had a ready explanation for Ins conduct-he was a journalist
who "wanted to know who the people in these chat rooms were and what
role law enforcement played in both investigating and prosecuting persons
involved in the exploitation of children. ' "r Furthermore, he wanted to write
a magazine story on these issues74 and, to do so, this was, as Matthews's
attorneys wrote, "an unfortunately necessary means of gathering
information."75 Matthews, in brief, was playing a journalist's watchdog
role, serving as a check on the government's efforts to clean up
cyberspace. 76
But Matthews offered more than this general explanation for is online
conduct. He could, in fact, offer the federal government reasons for nearly
every specific activity mwhichhe engaged. Considerthe following queries
and Matthews's responses to them:
-Why didMatthews actually transmit child pornographyhimselfrather
than merely receive it? Because, he contended, child pornography is the
"coin of the realm" and trading it is "a means to maintain contact with
persons in the chat rooms and gain access to their secrets." 77
* Why didn't Matthews identify himself as a journalist in the chat
rooms? Because "[h]e felt that only by going 'undercover' and acting like
the persons in the [chat] rooms would he be able to penetrate this world and
71 Id.
' Brief of Appellant at 4, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
7Id. at 4-5.
741d. at 10.75Id. at 11.
11 It is sometimes asserted that "the press has special institutional responsibility
as a watchdog of government" KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER,
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 419 (1999). See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA
260-87 (1991) (describing the "Fourth Estate" model of press freedom m which
journalists nmst receive First Amendment protection m order to serve as a check
on transgressions of the three branches of government in the fulfillment of their
duties).
' Brief of Appellant at 5, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
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gain some insight into this murky, strange, cyberspace reality "78 What's
more, Matthews contended that when he did reveal his true identity while
working on a similar story for WTOP radio in 1995, "[h]e found that this
admission caused the rooms to empty, making it impossible to investigate
the story."
79
- Why was it necessary to spend six months in these chat rooms?
Because inmersmg himself m the seamy underbelly of the worlds on
which he reported and consorting with the unsavory characters who reside
therein was simply part of Matthews's standard journalistic investigative
techmques, he argued.80 In their brief to the Fourth Circuit, for instance,
Matthews's attorneys noted that "[e]arly in his career, he did a story on
prostitution ,in Washington, D.C. and spent several nights walking the
streets with the prostitutes.' ' On another story-this one about the
growing homelessness problem m the md-1980s-Matthews "spent a few
days living on the streets as a homeless person, sleeping in shelters and
spending time with the homeless as one of them." 2
This time around, however, the problem for Matthews was that the FBI
believed he really was "one ofthem"--a sexual predator distributing child
pornography on the Intemet. 3 It probably didn't help that Matthews was
working at this time as a freelance joumalist rather than as one employed
by a news agency and specifically assigned to the topic.84 It also didn't aid
Ins cause that, when Matthews's residence was searched in December
1996, "no notes, drafts of articles, completed articles, research materials or
other work papers regarding child pornography or child prostitution were
found." 5
But Matthews had an explanation even for this. He didn't have any
drafts or notes because "he never found the 'hook,' the angle, and he kept
looking."8 6 He also claimed that "since he had not yet determined the focus
of the story, he had not felt the need to print out his communications or
78Id. at 11.
79 Id. at 8-9.
0 See id. at 6.
1 Id.
82.1d.
83Brief of Appellee at 7-11, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
"The Fourth Circuit accepted as true Matthews's version of the facts that he
was acting as ajournalist. United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338,350 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 260 (2000).85 Brief ofAppellee at 10-11, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
96 Brief of Appellant at 11, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
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make extensive notes. '87 What Matthews had termed as his own "stake
out"88 simply had not panned out.89
Despite Matthews's lack of notes and story drafts, he did have three
other potentially nportant facts in ns favor suggesting that his "journalis-
tic purpose" claim was true. First, just one year before, Matthews had
researched and reported a three-part series for WTOP radio regarding
the availability of child pornography on America Online.90 Second, dur-
ing Ins research for this earlier story, he actually had initiated contact on
his own volition with the FBI to report "a person whose screen name
was 'Martha4U' and who claimed to be prostituting her children."'
He could appear, in brief, to be acting as a good cyberspace Samari-
tan. Third, Matthews had never before had criminal charges filed against
him.92
Ultimately, however, these facts and their potential for exculpa-
tion proved meaningless. Matthews was indicted by a federal grand jury
m July 1997 and charged with six counts of transmitting child porno-
graphy and nine counts of receiving such material.93 He eventually
pleaded guilty m June 1998 to two charges of transmitting and receiving
child pomography -- one involving a depiction of a prepubescent
minor female engaged in sexual intercourse with a male adult and the
other showing a female performing oral sex on a prepubescent minor
female.95 Matthews was sentenced in March 1999 to eighteen months
m federal prison and was fined $4000.?6 His unsuccessful efforts to
assert a First Amendment-based defense against the charges at both
the district and appellate court levels are described and analyzed be-
low
171d. at 13.
881 Id. at 10.
19 Id. at 13.
1° Id. at 8.
91Id. at 9.
' United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338,340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 260 (2000).
93 BnefofAppellee at 2, Matthews (No. 99-4183). See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(l)-
(2) (1994) (setting forth the federal law for transporting and receiving child
pornography under which Matthews was charged).
94Craig Whitlock, Reporter Gets 1-1/2 Years for Child Pornography, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 1999, atB1.
95 Matthews, 209 F.3d at 346.
96Whitlock, supra note 94.
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A. Raising the Defense, Framing the Issue
Matthews first raised and argued ins "legitimate-use" defense m a
Maryland federal district court, m a motion to dismiss the charges against
him.97 He contendedthat federal child pornography laws were "unconstitu-
tional as applied to a journalist's news gathering activities."98 More
specifically, Matthews argued that "his use of the pictures is protected by
the First Amendment's protection of the press."99 The district court thus
framed the issue before it as "whether the First Amendment requires that
the Defendant be granted relief from this general prohibition [against
transporting and receiving child pornography] if he violated the law during
news gathering activity.""
It is important to note that Matthews was not claiming that he should
be protected automatically, or as a matter of law, by the First Amendment.
Rather, he simply sought the opportunity to present a First Amendment-
based defense to the jury.' The district court, however, denied him this
opportunity and rejected the motion to dismiss.'0
On appeal, the First Amendment-based issue was sunilarly framed. The
Fourth Circuit wrote that "Matthews presents an issue of first impression
in this circuit: does the First Amendment permit a bona fide reporter to
trade in child pornography to 'create a work of joumalism'?"'0 3 The
appellate court agreed to use Matthews's terminology that he was seeking
a First Amendment defense against the charges, but it took the time to
characterize this as an "as-applied" challenge to the federal child pornogra-
phy laws."14
97 United States v. Matthews, 11 F. Supp. 2d 656 (D. Md. 1998), afid, 209 F.3d
338 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 260 (2000).
9Id. at 660.
99Id. at 661.
100 Id. at 662. Matthews also asserted that the relevant federal statute---18
U.S.C. § 2252-was unconstitutional because it failed to include a sufficient mens
rea requirement beyond the requirement of "knowingly" transporting or receiving
child pornography. Id at 659-60. This argument, which was rejected by both the
district and appellate courts, is beyond the scope of this Article which, instead,
focuses on the First Amendment-based "legitimate-use" defense.
"01 See id. at 660.
102 Id. at 664.
"' United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 342 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 121
S. Ct. 260 (2000).
104 Id. at 341 n. 1.
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As was the situation at the trial court level, Matthews did not claun on
appeal that journalists engaged in news-gathering activities are automati-
cally entitled to a special exemption from child pornography laws. 1°5
Rather, he contended that the trial court judge should have allowed him to
present a First Amendment defense to ajury. "I Referring to the arguments
of Matthews and various anuc,' 07 the Fourth Circuit wrote: "Let the jury
decide, they argue: ifthejury concludes that Matthews traded inpornogra-
phy solely for a proper purpose, then the First Amendment prevents
conviction; if the jury concludes that he acted for another purpose, then
conviction is appropriate."108
With the issue now framed, the next two sections describe the
arguments on both sides. Section B, culling from Matthews's brief to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals as well as the amicus briefs filed on his
behalf, details the arguments in favor of allowing ajournalist-defendant to
present a "legitimate-use" defense. Section C, drawing from the govern-
ment's brief, then addresses the arguments against this alleged right.
B. The Arguments onBehalf ofMatthews
Six related lines of argument on behalf ofMatthews's right to have the
opportunity to present a "legitimate-use" defense can be distilled from the
various briefs filed mthe case: 1) the First Amendment provides protection
for news gathering; 2) the public has a right to know information that
affects laws and law enforcement; 3) the United States Supreme Court's
decision in New York v. Ferber"° carves out an exception for legitimate
uses ofchildpornography and suggests the right to make a "legitimate-use"
defense; 4) lower courts in other federal circuits have recognized the right
to assert a defense in similar circumstances; 5) the legislative intent behind
child pornography laws is not served by pumshing Matthews for Ins use of
sexually explicit images of minors; and 6) the failure to recognize a
"legitimate-use" defense forjournalists would have a slippery slope effect
on other legitimate uses. These lines of reasoning are addressed below, in
order.
o0Id. at 344 n.3.
6MId. at 344.
107 Briefs of amici cunae were filed on appeal on behalf of Lawrence Matthews
by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (jomed by other journalism
organizations) and the American Civil Liberties Union.108 Matthews, 209 F.3d at 344.
'
09New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
[VOL. 89
REPORTING ON CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
1. A First Amendment Right to Gather News Protects Matthews
"[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated." ' °
As might be anticipated, attorneys for Lawrence Matthews trotted out
this language from the United States Supreme Court's 1972 decision in
Branzburg v. Hayes.11 In Branzburg, a divided Court refused to create a
First Amendment privilege for journalists not to testify in grand jury
proceedings but also wrote that "news gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections. 112
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press ("RCFP"), in an
amicus brief to the Fourth Circuit that was joined by other prominent
journalism organizations such as the Radio-Television News Directors
Association ("RTNDA"), National Public Radio, Inc. ("NPR"), and the
Society ofProfessional Journalists ("SPJ"), also seizedupontheBranzburg
decision."3 The RCFP opened its brief by admomshing the appellate court
that:
It is inportant to begin by noting that the First Amendment's guarantee
of press freedom is meaningless if journalists do not possess a concomi-
tant right to gather the news. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707
(1972), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment's
protection of a free press carries with it protection for essential
newsgatherng.1 4
Several federal appellate courts, relying on the dissenting opinions and
the concurrence of Justice Powell in Branzburg, have adopted a qualified
or conditional privilege that excuses reporters from disclosing the identity
of confidential sources m some circumstances in criminal and civil
proceedings."5 The purpose of this testimomal privilege, much like the
"oBranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
'Brief of Appellant at 30, United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir.
2000) (No. 99-4183).
"
2 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707




5 SeeUnited States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963,969 (5th Cir. 1998) (observing that
"some courts have taken from Justice Powell's concurrence a mandate to construct
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First Amendment-based defense asserted and sought by Lawrence
Matthews, is to help journalists to gather news.
For instance, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Baker v. F & F
Investment,n6 in recognizing a qualified reporter's privilege, wrote that
"[c]ompelled disclosure of confidential sources unquestionably threatens
a journalist's ability to secure rnformation that is made available to him
only on a confidential basis."'I 7 The appellate court in Baker, citing what
it called "a paramount public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous,
aggressive and independent press,"' ' 8 added that "[tihe deterrent effect"
that "disclosure is likely to have upon future 'undercover' investigative
reporting . threatens freedom of the press and the public's need to be
informed."" 9 It is language from decisions such as Baker that supports
news-gathering testimomal privileges and, Lawrence Matthews hoped by
extension, a First Amendment defense to trade child pornography in the
course of news gathering.
The problem with this argument, however, is, as media attorney John
K. Edwards recently wrote, that "the U.S. Supreme Court has been slow to
fully acknowledge the constitutional significance of newsgathermg
activities"'20 and that "many lower courts have not accepted the existence
of any constitutional right to gather the news.'' In their 1999 treatise on
news gathering, C. Thomas Dienes and his colleagues concur with these
sentiments, acknowledging that the dimensions of the First Amendment
news-gathering right are "decidedly uncertain."'
a broad, qualified newsreporters' privilege m criminal cases" but declining tojom
with. these courts). The scope of the qualified privilege "vanes greatly by
jurisdiction." KENT R. MIDDLETON ET AL., THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION
447 (5th ed. 2000). A complete discussion of testimomal privileges protecting
confidential sources and other information is beyond the scope of this Article. For
current information on testimniomal privileges and shield laws protecting reporters
from revealing sources and information, see the Reporter Committee for Freedom
of the Press' Web page on this subject, Confidential Sources and Information, at
http://www.rcfp.org/csi/ (Summer 1998).
"6 Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
17 1d. at 782.
I's Id.
119Id.
120 John K. Edwards, Should There Be Journalist's Privilege Against
NewsgatherngLzability?, CoMM. LAW., Spring 2000, at 8, 8.211d. at9.
'DC. THOMAS DIENEs ETAL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 1-5, at 15 (2d
ed. 1999).
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What's more, any constitutional right to gather news conflicts with
what the Supreme Court m Cohen v. Cowles Media Co." called its "well-
established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."124
The laws against transmission and receipt of child pornography, of course,
are generally applicable: they don't single out or target members of the
press.1' Parsed in its most blunt and controversial form, then, what
Matthews was requesting was not just a First Amendment right to gather
news, but a First Amendment right to engage in criminal conduct m the
process of gathering news. This is a right the Supreme Court has never
recognized.126 If there is no First Amendment right to violate generally
applicable civil laws in news gathering,"Z then there clearly is no right to
violate generally applicable criminal laws. In fact, m the same decision in
which the Court suggested that the First Amendment protects news gather-
mg, it also wrote that "[i]t would be frivolous to assert-and no one does
in these cases-that the First Amendment, in the interest of securing news
or otherwise, confers a license on either the reporter or his news sources to
violate valid criminal laws."''
On the other hand, Matthews was not claiming that the First Amend-
ment givesjournalists absolute or blanket protection-what theBranzburg
Court called "a license"' 29 -from generally applicable criminal laws.
Instead, he was contending that the First Amendment should provide
journalists with the opportunity to argue and to prove before a jury that in
some circumstances the interest in gathering news outweighs the interest
in enforcement ofa particular criminal law."3 The fact finder would be left
to decide whether the interest was sufficient to overcome application ofthe
law given the particular circumstances in each case.
11 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
12 Id. at 669.
125 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(l)-(2) (1994) (setting forth the child pornography
laws under which Matthews was prosecuted and which apply to "any person," not
just to journalists or members of the press).
12 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669 (observing that "[t]he press may not with
impunity break and enter an office, or dwelling to gather news").
7 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 520-22 (4th
Cir. 1999).
12 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972).
i Id.
130 United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 121
S. Ct. 260 (2000).
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2. The Public's Right to Know Protects Matthews
Although the First Amendment does not explicitly provide protection
for the public's so-called "right to know," the United States Supreme Court
has recognized that the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press
include peripheral rights encompassing the right to receive information and
the freedom of inquiry 131 An appeal to a tenuous and unenumerated First
Amendment public right to know,13 1 M fact, "serves as the core element of
the journalism ethos.' 3 3 The right to know mantra is so appealing to
journalists, writes Professor Christopher Meyers, because it "provides a
greatergooddefense, givingjoumalists (supposed) valid moralreasons for
engaging m what would otherwise be seen as improper behavior."'134 As
applied to the case of Lawrence Matthews, this would mean that the greater
good of exposing sexual exploitation of minors and the trafficking in child
pornography on the Internet provides a valid moral reason for engaging m
criminal conduct in the news-gathering process.
It is not surprising, then, that the RCFP's brief took up the public's
right to know argument, contending:
The free flow of information to the public is vital to democracy. The
public has a strong interest in knowing both about the prevalence of child
pornography on the Internet, and about law enforcement efforts to
eradicate it. Arguably, the most effective way to report on these issues is
to gain access to the Internet to observe these matters first-hand. 135
I"' Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980)
(recognizing that the First Amendment includes the right to receive information);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (recognizing that the First
Amendment includes freedom of inqury).
132 C. Thomas Dienes and his colleagues explain the tenuous nature of the right
to know:
[T]he beguiling phrase "the right to know" straddles the often fine line
between governmental restriction on the right to receive information, which
the freedom of expression principle typically will not tolerate, and an
affirmative right to compel government to disclose that which it would
prefer to hold in confidence, a right that has not traditionally been held to
be secured by the First Amendment.
DIMNES ET AL., sulpra note 122, § 1.3, at I 1 (footnote omitted).
133 Christopher Meyers, Justifying Journalistic Harms: Right to Know vs.
Interest in Knowing, 8 J. MASS MEDIA ETHics 133, 134 (1993).
13 Id.
131 Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant Seeking Reversal at 12,
United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-4183).
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Matthews's brief also strongly suggested a right to know argument
linking the First Amendment and journalism. In particular, Matthews's
attorneys described hun as "dedicated to the ideals of journalism as a
source of information for the public regarding matters of significance to
society."13
The ACLU, in its amicus brief, also made a right to know argument m
support of a legitimate-use defense. Writing for the ACLU, Ann Beeson
argued:
It is wholly mconsistent with the First Amendment for the government to
threaten with cnmmal sanctions legitimate researchers who study,
investigate, and report on the phenomenon of child pornography. With no
First Amendment defense, child pornography statutes wouldprohibit the
public from learning anything about the problem of childpornography
outside the limited information law enforcement was able and willing to
provide.137
Arguably, the public's right to know in Matthews is at its highest level
because the defense in question relates to the functionmg of government
agencies. The United States Supreme Court wrote in Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia' 8 that the First Amendment freedoms of speech and
press "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of commumca-
tion on matters relating to the functioning of government."'13 9 Lawrence
Matthews, it will be recalled, intended to write a magazine article relating
to how well the government was policing the Internet and protecting
minors from sexual exploitation in cyberspace."4 The article, in other
words, was to have dealt with what the Richmond Newspapers Court
termed "the functioning of government."'41
That this article may have been critical of the government's efforts to
patrol cyberspace further militates in favor of allowing Matthews to assert
a First Amendment-based "legitimate-use" defense. Why9 Because the
' Brief of Appellant at 5, Matthews (No. 99-4183) (emphasis added).
'
37Brief of Amici Curiae The American Civil Liberties Umon, the ACLU of
Maryland, the ACLU of the National Capital Area, and the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Appellant, and Reversal at 14-15,
Matthews (No. 99-4183) (emphasis added).
"' Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virgmia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
139 Id. at 575.
1o See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
14' Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 575.
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Supreme Court has made it clear that the First Amendment must provide
enhanced protection "for the citizen-critic of government. ' 142 As the Court
wrote mnew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 "criticism of official conduct"
is "the central meaning of the First Amendment." 144
On top ofthis, one may logically argue that the article Matthews hoped
to write based on his Internet research could be classified as political
expression affecting legislative decision making. One of his alleged goals
was to inform the public about the dangers of sexual predators and the
sexual exploitation of minors on the Internet.'45 An article on this subject
would provide the public with information and knowledge necessary to
engage in informedpolitical debate on the topic. This debate, in turn, could
mfluence or affect legislative decision making by leading to the revision or
creation of laws relating to child pornography, sexual predators and the
Internet.
Viewed in this light, Matthews's right-to-know argument also draws
support from fundamental theories of free expression. In particular, the
public's right to know about matters of public concern that could affect
legislative decision making was at the heart of the theory of free expression
espoused by the late philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn. 146 He
believed that "the principle of the freedom of speech springs from the
necessities of the program of self-government."'4 In a self-governing
democracy--one in which the "[r]ulers and ruled are the same
mdividuals"'--wise decisions about public policy require that "all facts
142 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
143 Id. at 254.
144 Id. at 273.
145 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
146 Meiklejohn was far more than a free speech theorist. See generally
ALEXANDER MEIKLEIoHN: TEACHER OF FREEDOM (Cynthia Stokes Brown ed.,
1981) (combining a collection of Meiklejohn's educational, philosophical, and
legal writings with biographical information). Meildejohn "wanted higher
education to develop social intelligence in students," which he defined as "the
ability to control one's social environment." MICHAEL K. HARRIS, FivE
COUNTERREVOLUTIONISTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 46 (1970). Ultimately, he
"believed that the college, standing apart from its social environment, should
develop m its students the intelligence to become responsible citizens of a
democratic society." Id. at 163.
147 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948).
148 Id. at 12.
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and interests relevant . . shall be fully and fairly presented."'149 As
Meiklejohn wrote, "[s]elf-govemment can exist only insofar as the voters
acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the
general welfare that, m theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express."'' 0
The ultimate aim of free expression, then, "is the voting of wise
decisions." 151
Matthews's research on child pornography might have provided the
foundation for an article that could have affected, concomitant with the
Meiklejohman tradition, the voting ofwise decisions on child pornography
laws. A strong argument thus can be made that, in order for the public to
know as much information as possible about the topics of child pornogra-
phy and sexual predators on the Internet, Matthews should have been able
to assert a "legitimate-use" defense.
3. Ferber Created an "As-Applied" Exception that Protects Matthews
One of Lawrence Matthews's key arguments on appeal was that the
United States Supreme Court m New York v. Ferber,'" a 1982 decision
holding that child pornography falls outside the scope of First Amendment
protection for speech,5 3 recognized that there may be some uses of child
pornography that are constitutionally protected.I- In particular, Matthews
argued that "the Ferber Court recognized that even child pornography
receives First Amendment protection when used as part of a work of
medical, educational, or artistic value.""' He contended, in turn, that his
own Internet research was "in connection with the intended creation of a
work of educational, literary, and political value."''I 6
Matthews's brief, however, does not identify any specific language
from the majority opinion m Ferber that creates an explicit or direct
49 Id. at 26.
'
5 0 Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP CT.
REv 245,255.
' MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 147, at 26.
' New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
" Id. at 763 (stating that "[r]ecognzng and classifying child pornography as
a category of material outside the protection of the First Amendment is not
incompatible with our earlier decisions").





exception for legitimatejournalistic uses ofchildponography. Instead, the
brief cites the following language from Ferber relating to the possible
overbreadth'57 ofchildpomography statutes as necessitating the availability
of an "as-applied" exception to the general rule against the protection of
this material: "'whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through
case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions,
assertedly, may not be applied.'""
The Ferber majority, acknowledging concerns expressed by the New
York Court of Appeals earlier in that case, suggested that such a case-by-
case, fact-specific analysis might occur in situations of sexually explicit
images of minors "ranging from medical textbooks to pictorials in the
National Geographic."'159 Matthews's attorneys used this language, in part,
to argue that "[t]he Ferber Court noted whether a particular use of child
pornography is protected by the First Amendment should be determined on
a case by case basis."' 10
There is other language in Ferber favorable to Matthews. In a
concurring opinionjoined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan wrote that
the application of child pornography statutes "to depictions of children that
in themselves do have serious literary, artistic, scientific, or medical value,
would violate the First Amendment.1 16' By extension, Matthews was
seeking to examine child pornography that, although it did not possess in
itself such serious values, could have led to a news story that would have
serious literary value.
Perhaps the strongest language in Ferber cited by Matthews, sug-
gesting an exemption for legitimate journalistic uses of child
pornography, 62 is set forth in the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens. 63
Stevens wrote:
A holding that respondent may be punished for selling these two
films does not require us to conclude that other users of these very films,
or that other motion pictures containing sinilar scenes, are beyond the
157 "An overbroad law sweeps m too much speech." SULLIVAN & GUNTHER,
supra note 76, at 320.
1'8 Brief of Appellant at25, Matthews (No. 99-4183) (emphasis added) (quoting
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773-74 (citation omitted)).
159 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773.
160 Brief of Appellant at 17, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
161 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring).
162 See Brief of Appellant at 26-27, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
'6 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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pale ofconstitutionalprotection. Thus, the exhibition ofthese films before
a legislative committee studying a proposed amendment to a state law, or
before a group ofresearch scientists studying human behavior, could not,
in my opinion, be made a crime. Moreover, it is at least conceivable that
a serious work of art, a documentary on behavioral problems, or amedical
or psychiatric teachmg device, might include a scene from one of these
films and, when viewed as a whole in a proper setting, be entitled to
constitutional protection. The question whetheraspecific act ofcommuni-
cation is protected by the First Amendment always requires some
consideration of both its content and its context.0'
As discussed later m SectionD, the Fourth Circuit mMatthews rejected
the idea that either this language from Justice Stevens's concurrence or the
language from the majority opinion in Ferber created a First Amendment
defense. The Fourth Circuit reached, instead, what it called "the inevitable
conclusion that the Ferber Court rejected even the possibility of a broad
First Amendment defense like that proposed by Matthews.' 65
4. Other Federal Courts Have Recognized a "Legitimate-Use" Defense
Matthews's attorneys argued that case precedent other than Ferber
existed to support a First Amendment-based "legitimate-use" defense
against child pornography charges.166 They wrote that "[e]very court which
has addressed the question of whether there is a defense available under
Ferber to those who claim to possess child pornography for legitimate
purposes have [sic] allowed the defendants to present such a defense to the
jury.'
' 67
The two primary cases relied upon by Matthews for tins proposition
were United States v. Lamb 61 and United States v. Bryant.169 Neither case,
however, involved ajournalist claiming a legitimate use ofchildpornogra-
phy as part of his or her research for a news story. Instead, Lamb centered
6 Id.
165 United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 121
S. Ct. 260 (2000).
" Brief of Appellant at 28-30, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
167 Id. at28.
I68 United States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441 (N.D.N.Y 1996).
69 United States v. Bryant, No. CR92-35R (W.D. Wash. May 13, 1992) (order




on a prison psyciatrst who claimed that the possession of childpornogra-
phy image files on his computer hard drive was necessary for his
research,' while Bryant focused on the holder of a doctoral degree in
psychology who had previously researched child prostitution for his
masters thesis' and who claimed that the child pornography he possessed
was "for additional research on the subject of child prostitution.' '
The federal district court m Lamb, citing favorably both the Ferber
majority's conclusion that overbreadth in a child pornography statute
should be cured on a case-by-case basis'7 and the concurrences of Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens," held that Lamb should be allowed to
present an "unconstitutional-as-applied defense"'7 5 to the jury 176 Perhaps
more importantly, however, the court went beyond the language m Ferber
to articulate how academic research on the topic of child pornography is
closely related to wise and informed legislation in that area. The court
observed that, in drafting certain pieces of child pornography legislation,
the U.S. Senate relied on the research of Robm Lloyd, who authored a book
on boy prostitution that catalogued over 260 magazines featunng child
pornography." An academic researcher like Lloyd should be protected
from the application of child pornography laws, the court suggested,
writing that "it is difficult to imagme how a researcher today could catalog
so many publications of tins sort without running afoul of the child
pornography law. The answer is that such activity may be protected by the
Constitution."'7" In otherwords, acadennc research may inform lawmakers
about problems that needto be addressedby legislation. Without protection
for such research, lawmakers could be left in the dark about problems that
continue to fester.
The court in Lamb also noted that although the federal law against
receiving child pornography 7 9 does not include an express affirmative
defense for legitimate uses of child pornography by psychiatrists and
'M°Lamb, 945 F Supp. at 450.
171 Bryant, No. CR92-35R, at A2.
'7 Id. atA3.
'7 Lamb, 945 F Supp. at 448-49.
174 Id. at 449-50.
175 Md. at 449.
176 Id. at 450.
'7 Id. at 450 n.4.
178 Id.
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994) (setting forth the child pornography law under
which Lamb was prosecuted).
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researchers, this absence does notpreclude the existence ofan "as-applied"
First Amendment defense.' The court wrote:
Thus the fact that the affirmative defense was rejected could have just as
easily meant that Congress acknowledged that some small amount of
matenal literally covered by the statute was nonetheless protected by the
guarantee offree speech, rendering the express defense redundant, or
perhaps overly generous compared to what stands behind the First
Amendment's aegis.'
The other case precedent relied on by Matthews was an unpublished
order issued by a Washington state federal district court in United States v.
Bryant.18 2 In that case, the court allowed a psychologist,8 who had done
prior research on child prostitution, to assert a First Amendment defense to
charges of transporting child pornography under federal law. ms
Ronald Bryant claimed that he had "a valid educational purpose" for
transporting child pornography into the United States from Bangkok,
Thailand. 8 In particular, he alleged that he possessed the child pornogra-
phy "for additional research on the subject of child prostitution."'8 6 The
court accepted Bryant's argument that he should be allowed to prove this
to a jury, observing that "[a] social scientist cannot be forbidden access to
primary research material based solely on the harmfulness of his subject
matter."'8 7 The court limited the right to possess child pornography,
however, to that material "necessary for legitimate research purposes."' 88
The question of whether Bryant, in fact, had a legitimate research purpose
was "a factual one the court must leave for the jury.' ' 89
In summary, other federal courts-albeit none at the appellate
level-have allowed defendants to assert "legitimate-use" defenses to
110 Lamb, 945 F Supp. at 449.
181 Id. (emphasis added).182 United States v. Bryant, No. CR92-35R (W.D. Wash. May 13,1992) (order
denying motion to dismiss and setting an evidentiary hearing on motion to
suppress).
" The defendant held both a masters and doctoral degree m psychology from









charges of transporting and possessing child pornography. Although these
cases did not involve journalists, Matthews contended that his use of child
pornography was smilar to theirs because he too wanted to use the images
"for the purpose of creating a work which could be categorized as either
having educational, literary, or political value."' 9
5. The Intent of Child Pornography
Laws is Not Served by Prosecuting Matthews
Why do laws against child pornography exist? What interests do these
laws protect? The United States Supreme Court made it clear n New York
v. Ferber'91 that "[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of
children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance."'' 92
More recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that
"[t]hroughout the legislative history, Congress has defined the problem of
child pornography m terms of real children 193 and, until the passage of
laws regarding virtual child pornography,194 "the actual participation and
abuse of children in the production or dissemination or [sic] pornography
involving minors was the sine qua non of the regulatory scheme."1 95 In
particular, the Supreme Court has recogmzedthat interests supporting child
pornography laws include protecting minors from physical abuse during its
production as well as the psychological trauma that can be caused by the
permanent record it leaves behind, haunting the child in later life.196 In
addition, child pornography is regulated because it allegedly whets the
appetites of pedophiles to molest ninors. 197
Given these compelling government interests, it is not surprising that
the federal child pornography laws'98 fail to enumerate an exception for the
receipt or transportation of child pornography for scientific or medical
research or for educational purposes. The only express affirmative defense
is for possession of less than three visual depictions of child pornography
1" Brief of Appellant at 30, United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir.
2000) (No. 99-4183).
"' New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
192 Id. at 757
193 Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999).
' See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
'9' Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1089.




198 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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that a defendant either took reasonable steps to destroy or reported to law
enforcement. 11
Despite the express absence of a "legitimate-use" defense, the federal
district court m Bryant suggested that assertion of a First Amendment
defense in some instances does not frustrate the legislative purpose of child
pornography laws:
An academic researcher who transports or possesses child pornography
does not run afoul of the legislative purposes behind banning transporta-
tion orpossession ofchildpornography. An academic researcher who has
not produced the materials does not 'use' the children as the subjects of
child pornography. Nor has he transported the material for the purpose of
satisfymg others. Instead, he transports orpossesses the material to further
study the same problems legislators were concerned about m passing the
anti-pornography laws.?2
The key here, based on the court's strategic use of quotation marks,
seems to be the "use" to which child pornography is put. If the children
portrayed are being used as the sexual subjects of child pornography, then
this use is illegal. If the images, however, are used by a researcher in a
manner that actually might punish child pornographers m the future, then
Matthews has not caused further harm to the children but may actually help
them. One thus can argue that Matthews's individual use of images-not
use of the children m those images-would not frustrate the compelling
interests that underlie child pornography laws.
6. The Slippery Slope Effect and Parade ofHorrors
In its amicus brief, the ACLU trotted out what amounts to a slippery
slope argument about the horrors that could befall other legitimate uses of
child pornography ifthe appellate court did not step in to protect legitimate
uses by journalists.201 For instance, the ACLU argued that the manufactur-
19 Id. § 2252(c).
200 United States v. Bryant, No. CR92-35R, at A7 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 1992)
(order denying motion to dismiss and setting an evidentiary hearing on motion to
suppress) (citations omitted).
11 See Brief of Arnici Curae The American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU
of Maryland, the ACLU of the National Capital Area, and the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Appellant, and Reversal at 14-21,
United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-4183).
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ers of filtering software designed to protect children from pornography on
the Internet would no longer be able to perform this vital role if their staff
members could not search out sites with child pomography.2°2 The ACLU
notedthat "these compames employ staffwho search for childpornography
on the Internet on a daily basis, m order to add new sites to their list of sites
that the product blocks."2°3
The ACLU also suggested that the Sixth Ainendment2 °4 rights of
defendants m criminal cases wouldbe hamperedby the failure to recognize
a "legitimate-use" defense:
The lack of a legitimate use defense would also impede the ability of
criminal defense lawyers to provide adequate representation to defendants
charged under child pornography laws. For mstance, without an exception
to possess the allegedly illegal images, a criminal defense lawyer would
be seriously hampered in her ability to locate expert witnesses who could
testify regarding whether the materials met the child pornography
definition.205
Other researchers whom the ACLU argued would be negatively
affected by the failure to recognize a "legitimate-use" defense include
social scientists performing content analyses to document the amount of
child pornography on the Internet, researchers studying the relationship
between images and actions (inparticular, images ofchildpornography and
actions ofsex offenders), art histonans studyingartistic andpopularimages
of children, and English professors examining the portrayal of children in
movies and books.2° In a nutshell, the ACLU argued that the failure to
grant Lawrence Matthews the chance to present a defense would lead to a




m Id. at 18.
2
"
4 The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part that the accused in cnm-
mal prosecutions shall "have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for Ins defence." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. 2o Brief of Anici Curiae The American Civil Liberties Umon, the ACLU of
Maryland, the ACLU of he National Capital Area, and the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Appellant, and Reversal at 19,
Matthews (No. 99-4183) (citation omitted).
21Id. at 15-18.
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C. The Arguments Against Matthews
The government countered Matthews by arguing that it was unclear
whether the Supreme Court created an exception protecting some uses of
child pornography." 7 As the government's attorneys wrote in their briefto
the Fourth Circuit, "it is impossible to determine, based on the Court's
opinion in Ferber or the concurring opinions, whether or not Ferber
established a literary, scientific or medical exception under the First
Amendment to a statutory ban on child pornography."02 8
Furthermore, even if such an exception did exist, the government
contended that Matthews's use of child pornography did not fall within
it.m Why9 The government argued that because Matthews never actually
intended to use the photographs themselves in Ins news story and never
intended to describe them, he was not, at least literally, using them for a
literary, scientific or medical purpose21 As the government's attorneys
wrote:
[T]he defendant has never claimed that he was using, or planned to use,
the pictures m an appropriate context or before an appropriate audience.
Instead, he claimed that he was trading child pornography m order to, for
want of a better word, befriend child pornographers m order to obtain
iformation upon which he could base an article which he never actually
began to write.2
The government's argument here seems somewhat silly when put into
a research context-in order for a researcher studying child pornography
to be protected under such a crabbed interpretation of a First Amendment
defense, the child pornography itself must be republished in the final
research report. Under this rule, social scientists who publish their findings
from a content analysis regarding the amount of child pornography on the
Internet would be protected only if they also appended the offending
images to their report. Not only is this unpractical given page limitations
mpeer-reviewedresearchpublications that publish content analyses,' but
I Brief of Appellee at 21-24, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
2 Id. at 24.
2Id. at 24-2721 1 Id. at 26.
211 d. at 26-27
212 For instance, the peer-reviewed Journalism & Mass Communication
Quarterly publishes content analyses regarding the media. It limits manuscripts to
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it is ighly irome because it entailsfirther publication and dissemination
ofchildpornography. It actually defeats the purpose ofanti-childpomogra-
phy legislation.
Perhaps the government's most important andwel-supported argument
against Lawrence Matthews was its position that "[t]he First Amendment
does not provide journalists with a license to violate the law m the name of
news gathering?"1 This argument directly attacks Matthews's "right-to-
gather-news" theory set forth earlier.214 The government quoted the
Supreme Court's opinion in Branzburg v. Hayejs 2 5 for the proposition that
"[i]t is clear that the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental
burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or
criminal statutes of general applicability" 6 and for the principle that it is
"frivolous to assert. that the First Amendment, in the interest of securing
news or otherwise, confers a license on either the reporter or Ins news
source[s] to violate valid criminal laws."217
The government buttressed this line of reasoning by citing the Supreme
Court's 1991 decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 218 In that case,
the Court held that journalists are not shielded from civil liability for
promssory estoppel when they breach promises of confidentiality to
their news sources. 9 Justice Byron White, writing for a narrow five-
justice majority, concluded that the case was governed by a "well-
established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against
the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news.
' ,20
The government did not stop there, however. It contended that it knew
there were other, non-illegal means that could be used to gather the
information he sought just as effectively as the illegal means actually
employed?21 The government argued as follows m its brief to the Fourth
Circuit:
5000 words and never publishes photographs.2 3 Bnef of Appellee at i, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
214 See supra notes 110-30 and accompanying text.
21 BranzbUrg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
216 Bnef of Appellee at 28, Matthews (No. 99-4183) (quoting Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 682).2171d. (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691).
211Id. at 29.
219 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991).
2uId. at 669.
22' Brief of Appellee at 31, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
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[1]t is clear to even the untrained outsider that a resourceful journalist has
various lawful means, not connected with the Government in any fashion,
through which he or she may obtain information necessary to write an
article about child pornography or law enforcement efforts m that area. A
journalist could interview individuals convicted of trafficking child
pornography, develop sources currently involved in child pornography,
talk with medical health professionals who are experts in the field,
observe the on line conversations taking place m chat rooms like
'Preteens' without sending or asking to receive anypornograpluc pictures
himself, etc.t
The government, m brief, was telling the court that Matthews's
research was unnecessary. More disturbingly, the government was telling
journalists how to do their job-a troubling proposition for anyone who
believes that the press must not be controlled by the government. On closer
examination, however, the government's argument here raises important
questions: Was Lawrence Matthews confusing the roles of investigative
journalist and law enforcement agent? Was he plaimg cop rather than
reporter? Should a distinction be made between these two roles?
Journalists have taken on law enforcement roles in the past. In the late
1970s, for instance, a group of reporters from the Chicago Sun-Times
operated an aptly named bar-the Mirage--to expose fraud, bribery and
corruption among city inspectors.tm As philosopher and ethicist Sissela
Bok writes, "in this scheme, reporters assumed the investigative role ofthe
police and indeed worked closely with certain police officials."' 4 As
discussed later in this Article, practices such as this are controversial not
only because they put the journalist in the role of police officer, but also
because of the deception they entail.' Lawrence Matthews's conduct
arguably blurs distinctions between reporting on criminal activi-
ties--monitoring chat room conversations and observing the trade of child
pornography-andparticipating in criminal activities. To the extent that
journalists view their role as detached and neutral chroiclers of events
rather than involved and active participants, this is problematic. The
mId.
See GENE GOODWIN &RONF. SMITH, GROPING FOR ETHICS IN JOURNALISM
205-07 (3d ed. 1994) (describing the Mirage set up).
224 SISELLABOK, SECRETS: ONTHEETHICS OF CONCEALMENT ANDREVELATION
259 (1982) (emphasis added).
I See infra notes 314-20 and accompanying text (discussing how some jour-
nalists consider any form of deception in gathering news to be inappropriate).
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government's argument regarding alternative journalistic news-gathering
methods suggests not only that participation in criminal activity is
unprotected by the First Amendment, but that such techniques are not
required for effective investigative reporting. Part III later discusses in
more detail the implications of the Matthews case on the practice of
investigative journalism. 6
Before leaving the government's argument, it is important to note that
the government's brief to the Fourth Circuit fails to mention either the
Lamb21 or Bryantm decisions, cases relied on by Matthews as precedent
for a First Amendment-based defense. 9 Whether the product of intention
or oversight, this omission proved far from fatal before the appellate court.
That court's decision is described m the next section.
D. The Appellate Court's Decision
The Fourth Circuit ruled against Lawrence Matthews's right to present
a First Amendment defense.3 ° It concluded that, although his "version of
the facts" appearedto create "a close question," "Matthews's asserted First
Amendment defense simply enjoys no support in the law "I
The appellate court rejected Matthews's contention that the Supreme
Court in Ferber"2 created an exception for uses of child pornography that
lead to works with literary, educational, or political value? 3 The court
belittled Matthews's argument as nothing more than "rhetoric" with
"visceral appeal," and it concluded that "notwithstanding the skill of
Matthews's advocacy, Ferber does not provide the broad defense he seeks
to raise."23
The Fourth Circuit noted that although the Supreme Court created an
escape hatch in obscenity law-under the third part of the test in Miller v.
22 See infra notes 251-300 and accompanying text.
n7 United States v. Lamb, 945 F Supp. 441 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
United States v. Bryant, No. CR92-35R (W.D. Wash. May 13,1992) (order
denying motion to dismiss and setting an evidentiary hearing on motion to
suppress).
See supra notes 168-89 (describing the Lamb and Bryant decisions).
uoUnited States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 350 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 121
S. Ct 260 (2000).731 Id.
11 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
23 Matthews, 209 F.3d at 343-44.
nId. at 344.
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Californaus works that possess "serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value, ' 6 are protected--"the Ferber Court unequivocally
rejected such a defense mthe context of child pornography offenses."2u7 In
particular, the Fourth Circuit cited the language in Ferber that "a work
which, taken on the whole, contains serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value may nevertheless embody the hardest core of child
pornography 12238
The Fourth Circuit, on this point, apparently failed to appreciate that
Matthews's ultimate work-the news story-would not actually "embody
the hardest core of child pornography." Matthews was not going to
republish the images that he transmitted in chat rooms and thereby do
further harm to the children portrayed in them. The child pornography
would be used only as bait to lure pedophiles into conversations and to
gather information for a story that would not involve the use of images of
child pornography.
The appellate court found that granting Matthews the chance to make
a First Amendment defense would fail to protect against what it called "the
discrete set of harms to which child pornography legislation is
addressed."239 These harms, however, relate to the physical and psychologi-
cal abuse of minors in the creation of the images and to the psychological
trauma caused by the permanent record and redistribution of the images
that, in turn, fuel the market to create more child pornography Matthews,
of course, was not producing child pornography and his news story would
not further disseminate child pornography. That the Fourth Circuit did not
understand this is clear from its conclusion that "to permit a defense of the
sort urged by Matthews" would "allow the dissemination ofdepzctions that
threaten the very harms to children described in Ferber "2
The Fourth Circuit also was unswayed by the concurrence of Justice
Stevens in Ferber, which Matthews's attorneys cited in their brief and
wich was described earlier in this Article.241 The appellate court opmed
that while there was "intuitive appeal" 242 in Justice Stevens's observation
that the exhibition of child pornography "before a legislative committee
23s Miller v. Califorma, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
236 Matthews, 209 F.3d at 345 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
23S Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761).
239 d. at 348.
24 Id. (emphasis added).
241See supra notes 163-64.
242Matthews, 209 F.3d at 348.
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studying a proposed amendment to a state law, or before a group of
research scientists studying human behavior 243 would be a crime without
a First Amendment defense, the argument was flawed because "its
doctrinal roots are unclear "2
This last italicized statement reveals a clear unwillingness on the part
of the Fourth Circuit-traditionally one of the most conservative appellate
courts in the United States24 -- to create precedent where none exists. As
discussed later in this Article, the current climate of hostility towards the
news media likely contributes to such a reluctance to break new ground and
to expand protection for the press. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit actually wrote
that "mischief" could result from the adoption of a First Amendment
defense.246 All defenses, however, may be abused if courts do not actively
monitor their application. Some people today think the insanity defense is
abused m cnmmal cases, but it is not forbidden just because we fear some
people may "get away" with crimes by pleading insanity Courts have the
responsibility to police defenses for possible abuse.
Apparently because the doctrinal roots were not clear-the appellate
court noted but summarily rejected Matthews's reliance on Lamb and
Bryant24 ---the Fourth Circuit never bothered to reach the public policy
arguments regarding the public's right to know made by Matthews and the
amici. It simply was unwilling to create precedent where none existed. The
court also rejected the assertion that a First Amendment right to gather
news protectedMatthews; instead, the Fourth Circuit quoted language from
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.24" reiterating that "generally applicable laws
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news." ' 9 Also, the Fourth Circuit rejected the idea that Branzburg
protected Matthews.5
The Fourth Circuit's decision in April 2000 thus went against
Lawrence Matthews. The next Part of this Article examines some of the
ramifications of that decision for the practice of investigative journalism
u3 Id. at 347-48 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
2MId at 348 (emphasis added).
245 See James C. Goodale, Shooting the Messenger Isn't So Easy, N.Y L.J.,
Dec. 3, 1999, at 3 (describing the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals as "one of the
most conservative courts in the country").246 Matthews, 209 F.3d at 348.
247 Id. at 349.
"s Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
249 Matthews, 209 F.3d at 344 n.3 (quoting Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669).
20Id. at 344.
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and places it within the context of the current climate of hostility facing
journalists m the United States.
III. INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM AND THE MATTHEWS RESTRAINT:
AN UNFORTUNATE BUT INEvrrABLE RESULT9
Investigative journalists, write professors James Ettema andTheodore
Glasser, are "custodians of conscience."' They "hold the means to report
and disseminate stories that can engage the public's sense of right and
wrong" and they provide the public with "a morally engaged voice." In
the process, investigative journalists give readers "accounts of victims,
villains and institutions in disarray."" As well, they are willing to
"confront a certain sort of social reality- the reality of outrageous civic vice
and, by implication, the possibility of enhanced virtue m the conduct of
public affairs." z When all is said and done, investigativejournalists "help
to articulate the moral order by showing that the actions of alleged
transgressors are in fact transgressions."2' 5
Lawrence Matthews was, by these scholarly definitions and descrip-
tions, the epitome of an investigativejournalist. He was, if one believes his
side ofthe case, attempting to report a story that would engage the public's
sense of right and wrong about transgressions in cyberspace, expose a set
of innocent young victims preyed upon by pedophilic villains, and perhaps
even show the alleged disarray of government efforts to patrol and police
the Internet. The story itself could have resulted in both better law
enforcement efforts in cyberspace andnew legislation relating to the sexual
exploitation of minors on the Internet-the legal equvalents, in brief, of
"the possibility of enhanced virtue in the conduct of public affans"
described above by Glasser and Ettema.l All of Matthews's activities, in
fact, comport with the description of investigativejournalism provided by
Ettema and Glasser, with one important exception or caveat.
In particular, it will be recalled that they describe investigative
journalists as individuals who "hold the means to report and disseminate
stories that engage the public's sense of right and wrong."' ' The Fourth
2 ¢'JAMES S. ETEMA & THEODOREL. GLASSER, CUSTODIANS OF CONSCIENCE:
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM AND PUBLIC VIRTUE 3 (1998).
mId. at4.
mId. at 10.
2s4 d at 7
2s Id. at 62.
256 See supra note 254 and accompanying text
2 See supra note 252 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
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Circuit, however, legally stripped Matthews of what he claimed were the
"unfortunately necessary means of gathering reformation. '21u Matthews
could not function effectively as an investigative journalist-could not
perform his professional responsibility, in other wordsM9-- without the
ability to trade child pornography and to engage m sexually explicit online
conversations with individuals who identified themselves as young girls.
Accepting as true what one might call Matthews's "necessity"
contention regarding his news-gathering practices, an important issue
arises: To police the moral order, must investigative journalists have the
right to engage in conduct that itselfviolates the moral order? That is the
paradoxical and ethical question-a questicn about what practices are right
and wrong within the journalism professionF and a question that carries
profound implications for the enterprise of investigative reporting-that
underlies the legal considerations in the case of Lawrence Matthews.
Both the district and appellate courts answered the legal version of this
query in the negative, denying journalists the right to engage in illegal
conduct of their own in order to expose the illegal and inmoral conduct of
others. Although this result may hinder investigative journalists in their
efforts to serve as watchdogs and to expose transgressions of the moral
order, it is far from surprising. In fact, the legal accountability that tins
result promotes-its treatment ofjournalists not as an elite class above the
strictures of the law but as common citizens subject and accountable to
society for their own transgressions-may be viewed, in no small part, as
a judicial reaction to the growing public sentiment that journalists are, to
put it bluntly, out of control in their news-gathering tactics and not to be
trusted.
Trust, credibility, and respect are essential commodities in the
joumalism profession.261 When trust of the media is replaced by anger with
2" Brief of Appellant at 11, United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir.
2000) (No. 99-4183) (emphasis added).
19 Some would argue that "journalism is not a'profession.' "JAMESFALLoWs,
BREAKING THENEWS: HOWTHEMEDIAUNDERMINEAMERICANDEMOCRACY 150
(1996) (arguing that journalism is not a profession because it lacks fixed standards
for admission and does not require mastery over a specialized field of knowledge).
' This is an ethical question because "[m]edia ethics concerns right and
wrong" actions "taken by people working formedia." John C. Merrill, Introduction
to A. DAvID GORDON & JOHN MICHAEL KITTROss, CONTROvERSIES IN MEDIA
ETHICS 1, 1 (2d ed. 1999).
21 "The profession ofjournalism is built on trust. The loss of credibility can be
ethically fatal to a news organization." LouIs A. DAY, ETHICS IN MEDIA
COMMUNICATIONS 87-88 (3d ed. 2000).
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media, the chances of journalists receiving either public or judicial
sympathy are slim. The result of the public's current hostility toward the
media, writes attorney Bruce Sanford, "has been a palpable willingness to
silence the media-to curtail its ability to gather and report the news, and
to make us more dependent than ever on the government for our under-
standing of human events."262 In his 1999 bookDon 'tShoottheMessenger,
Sanford argues that "the public's anger toward the media is being played
out in the nation's courts, where judge after judge is limiting the public's
right to receive information. 263 We now can add the names of the district
and appellate court judges in Matthews to Sanford's list of '"judge after
judge."
The legal conclusion in Matthews certainly makes more sense when it
is viewed within the framework articulated by Sanford. In rejecting
Matthews's right to present a First Amendment defense, both the district
court andthe appellate court were, consistent with Sanford's interpretation,
limiting the public's right to receive information by limiting the press's
ability to gather information.
The overt skepticism and outright distrust ofthe media today that leads
to this result manifests itself clearly in the district court's opinion in
Matthews. Although the district court faced only the narrow issue of
whetherMatthews shouldbe allowedto present a First Amendment defense
to a jur9"-not the underlying substantive question on the merits of
whether, in fact, Lawrence Matthews received and transported child
pornography for a legitimate use-the court nonetheless went out of its
way to draft dicta that, in fact, reached the merits.
Judge Alexander Williams, Jr. was openly skeptical of Matthews's true
motives and, more disturbingly from the perspective of investigative
journalists, was more than willing to substitute his own news judgment for
that of an award-winning reporter. Judge Williams second-guessed
Matthews's investigative tactics, writing:
Surely there are other ways of determinng the amount of child pornogra-
phy available on the Internet and whether the images are easy to obtain.
While the Court is hesitant to give news gathering tips, the Court agrees
with the Government that other, legal avenues of investigation are
262 SANFORD, supra note 5, at 10.
263 Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
264 
'The question for the Court, therefore, is whether Defendant enjoys a First
Amendment defense that can be presented to the jury." United States v. Matthews,
11 F Supp. 2d 656,660 (D. Md. 1998), affild, 209 F.3d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 260 (2000).
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available. For example, a reporter could study the number of prosecutions
brought by the government and examine the public records m those cases.
A reporter could develop sources, including victims of child pornography
and people already convicted of violations. Finally, a reporter could
examine reports to public interest groups that track incidents of child
pornography distribution.265
Despite his professed hesitancy to give news-gathering tips to
journalists, the judge did not stop there. In Judge Williams's mind, there-
simply "must be other, admittedly more labor-intensive means of reporting
this story "2 He thus wrote:
The Court does not believe that the only way a reporter can confirm that
pornography is available on the Internet is to obtain and distribute the
images himself. Any person, reporter or otherwise, who wants to know
whether child pornography is available on the Internet is free to come to
federal court and observe a prosecution for a § 2252 violation. 267
What is happening in Judge Williams's dicta is that a court is
substituting its news judgment-its beliefs about how research can best be
accomplished in the field of investigative journalism-for that of a
seasoned reporter. The judge is telling the journalist how to gather
information. 0
Perhaps this occurred because the credibility ofjournalists in print and
broadcast has sunk so low in the eyes of many-including judges-that
their credibility m court is no different 6 s A lack of credibility in print, in
brief, may translate to a concomitant lack of credibility in court.
If the scenario were changed, however, to become one of judicial
advice on how to write the news rather than on how to gather the news,
such dicta from a judge would be radically inconsistent with fundamental
First Amendment principles of editorial control. For instance, in its 1998
decision in Shulman v. Group WProductions, Inc.,269 the Supreme Court
m Id. at 663.
2 Id. at 664.
267 Id.
= Cf David Shaw, Special Report: Crossing the Line, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20,
1999, § V3 (Special Report), at 4 (observing that "over the past two decades or
so--as rumor, gossip, scandal and sensationalism have come to occupy evermore
media space and time-news media credibility has plummeted").
m Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
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of Califorma wrote that "[tlhe courts do not, andconstitutionally could not,
sit as superior editors of the press."27° This language builds from the United
States Supreme Court's reasoning in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo271 that "[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper . .
constitute[s] the exercise of editorial control and judgment." 2 2 The
Supreme Court has made similar pronouncements m cases involving the
rights of broadcast journalists:
Forbetter orworse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection
and choice of material. That editors-newspaper or broadcast-can and
do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the
discretion Congress provided. Calculated risks of abuse are taken m order
to preserve higher values.
3
The problem for investigative journalists, of course, is that news
gathering and news reporting are fundamentally different activities as
viewed by thejudicial system. The deference given by courts to reporting
the news will never be extended to gathering the news as long as the public
and the judicial system have little confidence or trust in the ability of
journalists to carry out theirjobs in responsible manners. Rather than trust
the judgment of Lawrence Matthews or, at the very least, give a jury the
opportunity to evaluate his news-gatherngjudgment, courts will continue
to be hostiletowardjournalistic news-gathering activities in an era in which
journalism is perceived by many as nothing more special than any other
business enterpnse.274 The press is not just another business, of course, but
one that receives specific protection in the text of the First Amendment. 275
270 1d. at 488.
21 Mian Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
272 Id. at 258.
2 ColumbiaBroad. Sys., Inc. v. DemocraticNat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,124-25
(1973).
4 See generally Richard M. Cohen, The Corporate Takeover of News, in
CONGLOMERATES AND THE MEDIA 31, 36 (Erik Bamouw et al. eds., 1997)
(describing how news, regrettably, has become just anotherbusiness and observing
that "[n]ews values, once no-frills, no-nonsense, have been recast according to
corporate perceptions of what sells"); Neil Hickey, MoneyLust: HowPressurefor
Profit is Perver'ngJournalism, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 1998, at 28,
30 (contending "that-more so than at any other moment m journalism's
lustory-the news product that lands on newsstands, doorsteps, and television
screens is indeed hurt by a heightened, unseemly lust at many companies for even
greater profits").275 See supra noth 2 (setting forth the relevant portion of the First Amendment).
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Courts will not construe that text expansively, however, when it seems that
many news enterprises sunply use the First Amendment as means to ward
off government control and to protect corporate profit 7 6
For every journalist who engages in illegal conduct with a noble intent
to gather news that could affect the public interest and change laws, there
is likely ajoumalist who engages m illegal conduct simply because he or
she is too lazy to gather news through legal channels. The journalists who
fall into this second category make it that much harder forjournalists like
Lawrence Matthews to receive judicial sympathy. Two cases decided
shortly before the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Matthews illustrate the
second category and provide the negative aura in which that opinion was
written.
In 1998, journalist Mike Gallagher engaged in illegal con-
duct-illegally accessing the voice-mail system of employees at Chiquita
Brands International-to gather news about that corporation's business
practices.2" When Gallagher was sentenced one year later in July 1999 to
five years probation and 200 hours of community service for Is actions,
he openly admitted in court that he should have "found a better way 2 I
Butthe harm to news gathering and First Amendmentprotection-however
tenuous today it may be-had been done.
Judge Richard Niehuas admomshed Gallagher for violating the public
trust. "A person empowered by the First Amendment, a power given by the
people, is in a position of trust," the judge told Gallagher.279 In addition to
the public ignominy, Gallagher was fired by the Cincinnati Enquirer, his
employer at the time of the incident.30
Now consider an even better-known example of news gathering run
amok-the lies used by ABC employees to gain access to Food Lion
I6 See Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
17 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 273, 296 (1999) (contending that the First
Amendment today protects "not just news about events of political concern but
largely the ability of corporate media to turn a profit by catering to our voyeuristic
desire to watch others as they suffer in pain or revel in sexual passiop on television
and the Intermet").
277 See generally Nicholas Stem, Banana Peel, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 46 (describing the case involving Mike Gallagher, the
Cincinnati Enquirer, and the investigative series on ChquitaBrands International).
278 Dan Horn, Former Reporter Given Probation, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July
17, 1999, at B 1. He also stated in court that accessing voice-mail messages was not
appropriate behavior for reporters. Id.
279 Id.
280 Dan Horn, Former EnquirerReporter Guilty, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept
25, 1998, at A01.
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supermarkets to shoot hidden-camera footage ofallegedlyunsanitary food-
handling practices?"1 In October 1999, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit-the same appellate court that dealt a blow to the
investigative journalism tactics of Lawrence Matthews2-handed ABC
News what at first appears to be a resounding and hard fought legal
victoryll m a case that challenged investigative journalistic practices. 214
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.85 was the cross-appeal of
a $5.5 million jury verdict 286-- later reduced by the trial judge to
$315,000 287-- agamst ABC's PrmeTime Live news magazine for a story
about allegedly unsanitary activities at the Food Lion supermarket
cham 8 After the report first aired on ABC's PrimeTime Live on Novem-
ber 5, 1992, Food Lion sued ABC and its producers on four counts:2
9
fraud,290 breach of duty of loyalty,291 trespass,29 and unfair trade
21 See generally Goodale, supra note 245, at 3 (describing the case and
summarizing the results at the trial and appellate court phases).
282 Both the appellate decisions in the cases involving ABC and Lawrence
Matthews were made by three-judge panels. The only judge m common in the two
cases was Diana Gribbon Motz, who authored the court's opinion m Matthews and
joined m the court's opinion mFoodLion.
" "ABC News President David Westin called the ruling a victory for the
American tradition of investigative journalism." Lisa de Moraes, With Appeals
Court Ruling, ABC Won't Pay FoodLion's Share, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1999, at
C7.
2" See generally JAY BLACKET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 164-68 (3d
ed. 1999) (analyzing etlcal issues raised by the deceptivejournalistic practices of
ABC employees m gathering information about the Food Lion supermarket chain).
28 Food Lion, Inc. v Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
2 6 See Howard Kurtz & Sue Anne Pressley, Jury Finds Against ABCfor $5.5
Million, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1997, at Al (describing thejury verdict).
287 FoodLion, 194 F.3d at 511.
2
' Id. at 510.289 Id.
290 The fraud allegation requires proof that the defendant made a false repre-
sentation of material fact, either knowing it was false or making it with reckless
disregard of its truth or falsity, with the intent that the plaintiff rely upon it. Id. at
512. In addition, the plaintiff must be mjured through reasonable reliance on the
false representation. Id.
29 A breach of duty of loyalty occurs if an employee: (1) "competes directly
with her employer;," (2) "misappropriates her employer's profits, property, or
business opportunities;" or (3) "breaches her employer's confidences." Id. at 515-
16.
292 Trespass is an entry upon another's property without consent. Id. at 517. An
individual who exceeds the scope of consent to enterproperty commits atrespass.
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practices.293 The supermarket sought damages for the administrative costs
associated with hiring the two producers, as well as publication damages
for lost profits resulting from the broadcast.294
The Fourth Circuit ultimately threw out the fraud cause of action and
the claim for unfair trade practices and it awarded Food Lion only the
nominal sum of two dollars--one dollar for the claim of trespass and one
dollar for the breach of loyalty cause of action.2 95 The decision was a
victory for the press because the appellate court prevented Food Lion from
making what it correctly called "an end-run around First Amendment
strictures"296 by seeking publication damages not on a lawsuit for defama-
tion297 but rather on the grounds of how the news was gathered. Plaintiffs
seeking publication damages for reputational or emotional harm cannot
circumvent or bypass defamation law's tough standards by seeking such
relief through news-gathering torts.298
The triumph for investigative news gathering here, however, is
precisely limited to this result--one cannot win publication damages by
pleading around defamation law and focusing, instead, on how news is
gathered. The victory, in brief, was one on the question of damages. It
decidedly was not a judicial validation of deceptive news-gathering
methods.
Id. at 518.
293 Tins clan was made under North Carolina's Unfair Trade Practices Act,
which "prohibits '[u]nfair methods of competition' and 'unfair or deceptive acts
or practices' that are 'in or affecting commerce."' Id. at 519 (quoting N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1999)) (alteration m original).
'mId. at 511.
" Id. at 524.
291 d. at 522.
7 Defamation includes both the torts of libel and slander. W.PAGEKEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984).
The basic elements to state a cause of action for defamation include: (1) "a false
and defamatory statement concerning another," (2) "an unprivileged publication"
of that statement to at least one third party; (3) fault; and (4) "either actionability
of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm
caused by the publication." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
"Libel is written or visual defamation; slander is oral or aural defamation." ROBERT
D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 67 (2d
ed. 1994).
298 See Alan Cooper, FoodLion Fraud Claims Fail onAppealNAT'LL.., Nov
1, 1999, at A12 (observing that the appellate court's decision means that a claim
for losses based on reputation mustwithstand tests established by the United States
Supreme Court on libel law).
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Two points bear this out. First, it must be remembered that however
nommal the final damage award may have been, the appellate court didrule
in favor of Food Lion on both the trespass and breach of loyalty causes of
action. In fact, the Fourth Circuit admonished ABC for its news-gathering
methods, writing that "[w]e are convinced that the media can do its
zmportantjob effectively without resort to the commission of run-of- the-mill
torts." 29 The court clearly didnot endorse, in other words, the investigative
news-gathering methods of ABC.
The second point that must not be forgotten is that even though ABC
was forced to pay only two dollars in damages, the message sent by the
jury with its more than five million dollar award to Food Lion is that the
public is fed up with deceptive news gathering. It is hard for courts to
expandnews-gatherng rights to individuals like Lawrence Matthews when
public sentiment like that voiced by the FoodLion jury is so hostile to how
news is gathered.
Results like that in Matthews thus are unfortunate for both the practice
of investigative reporting and the public's right to know, but, as the
heading for tis part of the article suggests, they are perhaps inevitable in
an era of bad feelings toward the profession of journalism. It is true, as
Bruce Sanford writes, that "[a] golden age that for fifty years saw the
creation and expansion of a First Amendment right of the public to receive
information has concluded."' °
But this does not mean that a new age replete with increased protection
for news-gathering practices is not possible. Journalists now must attempt
to foster an atmosphere in which a free press is viewed by the public and
judiciary as socially significant-a free press that is trusted, respected, and
valued in its roles as news gatherer, information provider, public educator,
and watchdog on government and private corruption. A press that is trusted
and respected in these vital roles in a self-governing democracy is more
likely to receive public andjudicial support when it is accused of violating
generally applicable laws to gather information.
IV DISTINGUISHING LEGITIMATE USES FROM ILLEGITIMATE USES:
AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE FOR OTHER COURTS?
By concluding that journalists may not present a First Amendment-
based "legitimate-use" defense to child pornography charges, the Fourth
Circuit escaped a knotty question: How is the trier of fact to distinguish
299 FoodLion, 194 F.3d at 521 (emphasis added).
300 SANFORD, supra note 5, at 9.
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between a legitimate use of child pornography and an illegitimate use of
such material? Although the appellate court mMatthews avoided the issue,
the question is far from idle because the federal district courts that decided
theBryant30' and Lamb3°2 cases recognized such a "legitimate-use" defense
for academic researchers and psychiatrists yet provided no criteria for
resolving the issue.3 °3
Moreover, the sheer difficulty in distinguishing legitimate from
illegitimate uses may providejustification for denying thejudicial creation
of such a defense in the first place. Just as the Supreme Court in Branzburg
v. Hayes was hesitant to create a reporter's privilege because of the
difficulty in defining who is ajournalist 3 ---a problem that would similarly
plague the assertion of a "legitimate-use" defense by a journalist as
weU3 5-- appellate courts other than the Fourth Circuit may be wary of
creating a "legitimate-use" defense due to the definitional difficulty of the
concept "legitimate use."
If other courts should allow journalists to present a "legitimate-use"
defense to charges of transporting or possessing child pornography, then
juries must have some basis for determining what constitutes a legitimate
use. The most basic and direct form ofevidence, of course, is the testimony
from thejournalist-defendant. But this may amount to little more than pure,
self-serving professions of noble purposes.
The focus then must be placed on circumstantial ewdence of legitimate
use. There may be several types of circumstantial evidence that affect the
"legitimate-use" analysis. If a trial court recognizes this defense, the judge
might instruct a jury to consider a series of questions relating to circum-
301 United States v. Bryant, No. CR92-35R (W.D. Wash. May 13,1992) (order
denying motion to dismiss and setting an evidentiary hearing on motion to
suppress).
2 United Sates v. Lamb, 945 F, Supp. 441 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
3o3 See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
30Writing the opinion of the Court in Branzburg, Justice White observed:
Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of
newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light
of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely
pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or amimeographjust as much as of the
large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition
methods.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
11 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently developed a three-part test for
defining "journalis' in the context ofajournalist's privilege not to testify in certain
proceedings. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text
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stantial evidence, the resolution of which would influence tins determina-
tion.
In particular, it would seem that two distinct sets of ques-
tions-questions relating to journalistic indicia and questions relating to
research ndicia-would facilitate jurors in the decision-making process.
The journalism indicia questions include:
• Is the defendant really a journalist? This determination might be
made by applying the three-part test articulated by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in In re Madden °6 or by the definition ofjournalist or reporter
set forth in the shield law of the state of jurisdiction. °7
- Does the defendant have a contract or assignment to write, produce
or complete a report on childpornography? This could be evidenced by a
verbal agreement with an editor, news director or other manager if the
defendant is employed by ajournalism organization, or by a contract if the
defendant is a freelance reporter such as Lawrence Matthews. The presence
of a story assignment or contract militates in favor of finding a legitimate
use. Even if a contract does not exist in the case of a freelance journalist,
the jury should consider whether the defendant pitched or proposed the
story idea to editors at various publications in an effort to land a contract.
This too would suggest that the defendant was attempting to use child
pornography for a legitimate purpose.
• Has the defendant worked as a journalist on similar stones in the
past? Evidence that the defendant has investigated and written about the
306In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125,131 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[I]ndividuals claiming the
protections of the journalist's privilege must demonstrate the concurrence of three
elements: that they- 1) are engaged m investigative reporting; 2) are gathering
news; and 3) possess the intent at the reception of the news gathering process to
disseminate this news to the public.").30 Thnrty-one states and the District of Columbia have shield laws. Jean-Paul
Jassy, The Prosecutor's Subpoena and the Reporter's Privilege, COMM. LAW.,
Winter 2000, at 7, 8. State shield laws vary in how they define journalist or
reporter. For instance, Alaska's statute defines reporter as "a person regularly
engaged in the business of collecting or writing news for publication, or
presentation to the public, through a news organization; it includes persons who
were reporters at the time of the communication, though not at the time of the claim
of privilege." ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.390(4) (Miclhe 1998). In contrast, Colorado
defines a "newsperson" as "any member of the mass media and any employee or
independent contractor of a member of the mass media who is engaged to gather,
receive, observe, process, prepare, write, or edit news information for




topic of child pornography previously m his or her capacity as ajournalist
would suggest that the defendant has a legitimate use in pursuing the
subject matter further.
- How do others in the profession regard the defendant's work? The
opinion of colleagues in the industry speaks to the credibility of the
defendant. The more highly that priorworkis regarded as quality investiga-
tive reporting, the more likely it is that the use of child pornography in
question is legitimate.
The fourjournalism indicia questions wouldbe considered in a totality-
of-the-circumstances approach, with no single factor controlling the jury's
decision. In the case of Lawrence Matthews, some of these factors weigh
in Ins favor-he was well-respected by colleagues and had written about
the topic inthe past-while others militate against him. In particular, he did
not have a contract for the article for which he allegedly was conducting
research and Ins status as a journalist was somewhat suspect because he
was not employed by a news organization at the time the research in
question took place.
The other set of questions that a judge might instruct a jury to
consider-the research indicia questions-imcludes:
- How much illegal conduct did the defendant engage in during his
allegedresearch? This question is important because it suggests that there
surely must be a cutoff point when the consumption and transportation of
child pornography becomes so excessive or exorbitant that it would appear
unnecessary for legitimate journalistic uses. Although it is impossible, for
instance, to say with bright-line clarity that transmitting child pornography
more than one dozen times is excessive, sending child pornography more
than 1000 times may appear too much for a reasonable juror to constitute
a journalistic use and may seem, instead, to establish a use for personal
sexual gratification. There must, in brief, be some point of research
overkill at which a use of child pornography transcends what appears
necessary for researching a story to that which appears aimed at individual
pleasure.
e What type of research work product does the defendant possess?
Jurors addressing this question would consider whether the defendant
possessed notes of ns research activities that: 1) document screen names
of individuals with whom the journalist-defendant traded child pornogra-
phy; 2) contain the transcripts of online conversations with individuals
whom the defendant-journalist believes are sexual predators, including
dates, times and chat rooms in which those conversations took place; and
3) list the email and Web site addresses of individuals and entities from
whom the defendant received child pornography Jurors, in other words,
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would try to determine if the defendant-journalist possessed information
that would, in fact, be useful in preparing a news story on the topic of child
pornography on the Internet and/or the sexual exploitation of minors in
cyberspace. Expert testimony onjoumalistic note-taking and note-keeping
procedures might prove useful in resolving tins question.
It will be recalled that Lawrence Matthews did not possess notes or
otherresearch documents regarding childpornography or childprostitution
when agents searched Ins home."° Matthews contended, however, that
"since he had not yet determined the focus of the story, he had not felt the
need to print out Ins commumcations or make extensive notes."309 The FBI
was able, however, to document that Matthews either sent or received at
least 160 photographs of child pornography from July 1996 through
December 1996. 10 Whether this quantity or volume is excessive during a
six-month window should be left to the jury to determine, perhaps guided
by expert testimony from other investigative journalists who understand
what it takes to gather material for in-depth articles. Matthews's own.
attorneys argued that their client's "long hours of surveilling the Internet
and the abrupt commencement of long periods of time on line, are classic
indicia of researching a news story."311
In summary, juries should consider a number of different questions or
factors on the issue of legitimatejoumalistic use. Both the prosecution and
the defense should have the opportunity to put on evidence relevant to these
factors. And, ultimately, it should be left to the jury, weighing all of the
factors and considering all of the evidence, to decide whether to grant the
defendant a First Amendment-based exemption from charges of transport-
ing and receiving child pornography.
CONCLUSION
There are different spins that can be placed on the decision of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Matthews 12 From one
perspective, the decision can be seen as unleashing a damaging blow to
undercover investigative reporting, the watchdog role of the press, and the
public's right to know. Conversely, one can see it as a victory for the
31 United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 121
S. Ct. 260 (2000).30 Brief of Appellant at 13, Matthews (No. 99-4183).
310 Matthews, 209 F.3d at 340.
311 Brief of Appellant at 11, Matthews (No. 99-4183) (emphasis added).
312 Matthews, 209 F.3d at 338.
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fundamental prnciple ofequalitythat no person-not even ajournalist-is
above the law, for the government's efforts to crack down on those who
traffic m childpornography, and for a public tired ofintrusive news-gather-
mgmethods employedbyjournalists inthe name ofratings and readership.
Between these extremes, however, there may be other ways to look at
the decision. Some journalists, in fact, might view the decision not as a
blow to their profession but as a victory for honest, law-abiding journalists
andnon-deceptive news gathering. Although prominent andwell-respected
journalism organizations including the RCFP, RTNDA, and SPJjomed m
an amicus brief on behalf of Lawrence Matthews's right to present a First
Amendment defense at trial, 13 otherjournalists might argue that, m order
to be ethical, journalists never should violate the law or use deception to
obtain information, no matter how much public significance or conse-
quence that information might possess.314 These journalists, following an
'absolutist maxim or principle against deception, thus might view the
Matthews decision as a victory for mvestigative journalism-m particular,
as a victory for all investigative journalists who don't resort to illegal and
deceptive conduct to gather news.
Thesejournalists' beliefs are groundedinthe deontological philosophy
of Immanuel Kant, for whom "all deception is morally wrong.""1 What's
more, as media ethics scholar Clifford Christians and his colleagues point
out, "Kant's doctrine does not tolerate lawbreaking." 16 For Kant the
maxims and duties of truthtelling and honesty are universal and uncondi-
tional or, to use his term, "categorical." 317 Those duties should not be
broken, even if beneficial consequences might occur.1 The benefits of
informing the public about the sexual exploitation ofmmors on the Internet
and the horrors ofchildpornography in cyberspace, in other words, would
not justify breaking the law or engaging in deception to gather that
information.
Lawrence Matthews, if one accepts his side of the story, knowingly
engaged in deception by pretending to be personally interested in child
313 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text
314 "Some moral purists argue that, because truth is an animating principle of
the journalistic profession, any form of deception is taboo. According to this
Kantian view, such behavior erodes the bond of trust between reporters and their
audiences." DAY, supra note 261, at 85.
315 CLIFFORD G. CHRISTIANS El AL., MEDIA ETHiCS: CASES AND MORAL
REASONING 59 (5th ed. 1998).
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pornography and pretending, during online conversations, that he was
sexually interested m minors.3 19 He was engaged, in brief, not only in
illegal conduct but surreptitious and deceptive news-gathering methods.
This clearly contradicts the beliefs of those journalists who "subscribe to
a rigid rule, saying that any form of deception to obtain information is
unacceptable in a profession whose mission is truthtelling. 320
When viewed m this light, the Fourth Circuit's ruling against Matthews
may not be a blow to mvestigative journalism after all. It actually may be
a wake-up call for investigative journalists to clean up their acts-an
arguably much-needed cleanup that could improve their credibility and
trustworthiness among the public. It thus is not as clear as it initially may
seem that denying Matthews the opportunity to present a First Amendment
defense necessarily hurts the profession of investigative journalism.
There is another view within the profession that is diametrically
opposed to this belief. To conclude that the decision m Matthews is, in fact,
a destructive blow to aggressive investigative journalism, one must
abandon the absolutist, deontological Kantian perspective and instead
subscribe to a consequentialist or teleological approach to journalistic
conduct. As John Merrill, professor emeritus ofjournalism at the Univer-
sity of Missoun-Columbia and a specialist m journalism ethics, writes,
"[t]hejournalist who is ateleologist would want to take the action resulting
m the most good."321 Ajournalist in this journalistic camp might view the
beneficial consequences of Matthews's illegal conduct and deception as
outweighing any harm caused by these actions. There may be, m other
words, utility in the deception that justifies it or, to put it more bluntly, the
ends may justify the means.3 2
This is the moral essence, of course, of Matthews's legal argu-
ment-that to inform the public adequately and to play the role of
watchdog, it was necessary to break the law. As the RCFP wrote m its
amicus brief, journalists seeking to play a watchdog role "must, on rare
occasions and as a last resort, engage m activity that may techmcally
319 Matthews felt that "only by going 'undercover' and acting like the persons
in the rooms would he be able to penetrate this world." Brief of Appellant at 11,
United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-4183).
320 BIACK rAL., supra note 284, at 161.
321 JOHN C. MERRILL, JOURNALISM ETHICS: PHILOSOPHICALFOUNDATIONS FOR
NEWS MEDIA 67 (1997).
3 Journalists who engage m deception often "defend such tactics on the
grounds that as fiduciaries of the public, they are sometimes required to employ
deception to uncover a greater truth. In other words, the end justifies the means.'
DAY, supra note 261, at 85.
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violate a criminal statute, particularlywhen the violation does not cause the
harm that the law was intended to prevent."'3 The ends, in other words,
justify the means and the benefits of deception and illegal conduct
outweigh the harms, at least on some occasions. The greatest good for all
concerned, from this perspective, is better served by allowing Matthews to
violate the laws rather than by punishing ns conduct.
The benefits from Matthews's behavior are multiple: 1) informing the
public about a serious problem that affects the physical safety of miors;
2) exposing possible lax enforcement of child pornography laws by
government agencies; and3) mfluencing potential legislation to address the
serious problems revealed. The harms, on the other hand, caused by
protecting one individual's transmission and receipt of child pornogra-
phy-not its production or creation-arguably are minor.
The authors of tns Article believe that Lawrence Matthews's case
should have been heard by the United States Supreme Court and that he
should have been allowedto present a First Amendment-based defense. We
reach this conclusion, however, not because we believe that the potential
benefits of Matthews's activities outweighed the harms, but because the
case represented a propitious opportunity for journalists-an opportunity
at a time when public confidence in their profession approaches abys-
mal-to present a clear, cohesive and logical argument to the Supreme
Court and, perhaps more importantly, to the American public about the
importance ofnews gathering and the watchdog role ofthe press in the new
millennium.
In particular, the public must be made to see that tis issue is about
more than just dirty pictures, dirty talk, and a dirty man on the Internet. It
really is about the willingness of the public and judiciary to trust and to
protect journalists when they attempt to play a role that, when exercised
vigorously, protects the public. In order for that trust and protection to
arse, however, arguments must be made that adequately explain the
purpose and functioning of a free press in a democratic society It is only
then that the Court and the public will extend to journalistic news gathering
the same deference they accord to journalistic reporting.
Without this deference and protection, we will become, as media
defense attorney Bruce Sanford argues, increasingly reliant on the
government for information.324 That information may tell us only part of
the story-a part of the story told from the perspective of the government
323 BnefofAmici Curae m Support ofAppellant Seeking Reversal at 2, United
States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-4183).324See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
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and a part of the story that the government wants us to hear. In the
Meilcejohman sense, we may not have all of the information that we need
for the voting ofwise decisions and successful self-government."2 It may,
m other words, be a self-serving and mcomplete story with which we are
left.
This certainly may be the ramification of Matthews regarding our
knowledge about the problems of sexual exploitation of miors on the
Internet. In June 2000, for instance, the findings of a govemment-funded
survey called Online Victimization: A Report on the Nation's Youth were
released by the National Center for Missmg and Exploited Children.32s The
survey, conducted on behalf of the government by the Crimes Against
Children Research Center, found that approximately one in five ofthe 1501
children sampled in the United States had received a sexual solicitation or
approach over the Internet in the previous year.327 Sexual solicitations and
approaches were defined as "[r]equests to engage in sexual activities or
sexual talk or give personal sexual information that were unwanted or,
whether wanted or not, made by an adult."31 Only three percent of the
children, however, reported what the survey called "aggressive sexual
solicitations"--solicitations that included an attempt to contact the minor
in person, over the telephone, or by mail sent through the U.S. Postal
Service.3
29
The report attracted substantial media attention.3 That's good news.
But there is bad news. The media were doing little more in this case than
simply conveying the survey's results to the public. Journalists were not
independently investigating this issue on behalf of the public; they were not
trying to determine the accuracy ofthe government's data or attempting to
conduct their own first-hand research. The press, in brief, was reduced to
the role of megaphone or loudspeaker for information provided by the
government about the sexual exploitation of minors in cyberspace.
If the Fourth Circuit's decision m Matthews is adopted by other federal
appellate courts, the role ofjoumalism in informing the public about this
3 See supra note 147 and accompanymg text.
376 ONLINE VICTIMIZATION: A REPORT ON THE NATION'S YOUTH (June 2000),
available at http://www.ncmec.org/htm/onlinevictimreport.html.327 Id. at ix.
321 Id. at x.329 id. at i.
330 ee generally Miriam Garcia, Online Sex Content a Threat to Kids, Survey
Finds, ATLANTA 3. & CONST., June 9,2000, atAl 1 (summarizing the results of the
survey); Karen Thomas, Kids Run a 20% Risk of 'Cybersex' Advances, USA
TODAY, June 8, 2000, at IA (giving the survey results front-page coverage).
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topic necessarily will be that of government mouthpiece. The vast amount
of information the public would receive is that data which is given to the
press by the government.
If we are content as a society m having the press play tins role-as a
provider of government information rather than as a watchdog on the
government-then the Matthews decision was correct. But if we want the
press to do something more and if we want the First Amendment to mean
something more, then the decision was wrong and Lawrence Matthews
should have been given the opportunity to prove to a jury that Ins use of
child pornography represents the ideals embraced by investigative
journalism and a watchdog press and merits protection under the Constitu-
tion.
